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1 Introduction
The intergenerational transmission of skills and more generally of “knowledge how”
has been central to the functioning of all economies since the emergence of agricul-
ture. Historically, this knowledge was almost entirely “tacit” knowledge, in the stan-
dard sense used today in the economics of knowledge literature (Cowan and Foray,
1997; Foray, 2004, pp. 71–73, 96–98). Although economic historians have long recog-
nized its the importance for the functioning of the economy (Dunlop, 1911, 1912), it is
only more recently that tacit knowledge has been explicitly connected with the literature
on human capital and its role in the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of mod-
ern economic growth (Humphries, 2003, 2010; Kelly, Mokyr, and O´ Gra´da, 2014). The
main mechanism through which tacit skills were transmitted across individuals was ap-
prenticeship, a relation linking a skilled adult to a youngster whom he taught the trade.
The literature on the economics of apprenticeship has focused on a number of topics we
shall discuss in some detail below. Yet little has been done to analyze apprenticeship as
a global phenomenon, organized in different modes.
In this paper, we examine the role of apprenticeship institutions in explaining economic
growth in the pre-industrial era. We build a model of technological progress that empha-
sizes the person-to-person transmission of tacit knowledge from the old to the young (as
in Lucas 2009 and Lucas and Moll 2014). Doing so allows us to go beyond the simpli-
fied representations of technological progress used in existing models of pre-industrial
growth, such as Galor (2011). In our setup, a key part is played by institutions—the
family, the clan, the guild, and the market—which organize who learns from whom. We
argue that the archetypes of modes of apprenticeship that we consider in the model,
while abstract, can be mapped into actual institutions that were prevalent throughout
history in different world regions.
We use the theory to address a central question about pre-industrial growth, namely
why Western Europe surpassed other regions in technological progress and growth in
the centuries leading up to industrialization. In particular, we claim that medieval Eu-
ropean institutions such as guilds, with specific features such as journeymanship, were
critical in speeding up the dissemination of new productive knowledge in Europe, com-
pared to regions that relied on the transmission of knowledge within extended families
or clans.1
1Our emphasis on the role of clans in organizing economic life for comparative development is shared
with Greif and Tabellini (2010), although the mechanisms considered are entirely different.
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Before developing a theory of the modes of institutional organization of apprenticeship
and their implications for knowledge dissemination, we address three key issues one
should address in modeling. First, the main issue is the extent to which the mode of
organizing the transmission of skills was consistent with technological progress. We
take the view from the outset that all systems of apprenticeship are consistent with at
least some degree of progress. Even when the system has strong conservative elements
that administer rigid tests on the existing procedures and techniques, learning by doing
generates a certain cumulative drift over time that can raise productivity, even in the
most conservative systems. That said, the rates at which innovation occurred within
artisanal systems have differed dramatically over time, over different societies and even
between different products. Differences in rates of technological progress may in prin-
ciple have two different sources, namely the rate of original innovation and the speed
of the dissemination of existing ideas. While we discuss implications for original inno-
vation, our theoretical analysis focuses on the second channel. Specifically, we ask how
conducive the intergenerational transmission mechanism was to the dissemination of
best-practice techniques, and how conducive an apprenticeship system based on per-
sonal contacts and mostly local networks was to closing gaps between best-practice and
average-practice techniques.
Second, the training contract between master and apprentice (whether formal or im-
plicit), for obvious reasons, represents a complicated transaction. For one thing, unless
that transmission occurs within the nuclear family (in a father-son line), the person ne-
gotiating the transaction is not the subject of the contract himself but his parents, raising
inevitable agency problems. Moreover, the contract written with the “master” by its
very nature is largely incomplete. The details of what is to be taught, how well, how
fast, what tools and materials the pupil would be allowed to use, as well as other as-
pects such as room and board, are impossible to specify fully in advance. Equally, apart
from a flat fee that many apprentices paid upfront, the other services rendered by the
apprentice, such as labor, were hard to enumerate. This was, in a word, an archetypical
incomplete contract. As a consequence, in our theoretical analysis moral hazard in the
master-apprentice relationship is the central element that creates a need for institutions
to organize the transmission of knowledge.
Third, and as a result of the contractual problems in writing an apprenticeship agree-
ment, a variety of institutional setups for supervising and arbitrating the apprentice-
master relations can be found in the past. In all cases except direct parent-child rela-
2
tionships, some kind of enforcement mechanism was required. Basically three types of
institutions can be discerned that enforced contracts and, as a result, ended up regu-
lating the industry in some form. They were (1) informal institutions, based on repu-
tation and trust; (2) non-state semi-formal institutions (guilds, local authorities such as
the Dutch neringen); and (3) third party (state) enforcement usually by local authorities
and courts. In many places all three worked simultaneously and should be regarded as
complements, but their relative importance varied quite a bit. In our theoretical analy-
sis, we map the wide variety of historical institutions into four archetypes, namely the
(nuclear) family, the clan (i.e., a trust-based institution comprising an extended family),
the guild (a semi-formal institution), and the market (which comprises formal contract
enforcement by a third party).
Our theoretical model builds on a recent literature in the theory of economic growth
that puts the spotlight on the dissemination of knowledge through the interpersonal
exchange of ideas.2 Given our focus on pre-industrial growth, the analysis is carried
out in a Malthusian setting with endogenous population growth in which the factors
of production are the fixed factor land and the supply of effective labor by workers
(“craftsmen”) in a variety of trades. Knowledge is represented as the efficiency with
which craftsmen perform tasks. While there is some scope for new innovation, the main
engine of technological progress is the transmission of productive knowledge from old
to young workers. Young workers learn from elders through a form of apprenticeship.
There is a distribution of knowledge (or productivity) across workers, and when young
workers learn from multiple old workers, they can adopt the best technique to which
they have been exposed. Through this process, average productivity in the economy
increases over time.3
The central features of our analysis are that the transmission of knowledge (teaching)
2Specifically, the underlying engine of growth in our model is closely related to Lucas (2009), who in
turn builds on earlier seminal contributions by Jovanovic and Rob (1989), Kortum (1997), and Eaton and
Kortum (1999). Earlier explicit models of endogenous technological progress build on R&D efforts by
firms, following the seminal papers of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). While such mod-
els are useful for analyzing innovation in modern times, their applicability to pre-industrial growth is
doubtful, partly because legal protections for intellectual property became widespread only recently.
3Recent growth models that build on a process of this kind (in addition to Lucas 2009) include Alvarez,
Buera, and Lucas (2008, 2013), Ko¨nig, Lorenz, and Zilibotti (2015), Lucas and Moll (2014), Luttmer (2007,
2015), and Perla and Tonetti (2014). Among these papers, Luttmer (2015) also considers a market envi-
ronment where students are matched to teachers, although without allowing for different institutions.
Particularly relevant to our work is also Fogli and Veldkamp (2012), where the structure of a network
has important ramifications for the rate of productivity growth. The research is also related to models of
productivity growth over the very long run such as Kremer (1993) and Jones (2001).
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requires effort on the part of the master; that this leads to a moral hazard problem in
the master-apprentice relationship; and that, as a consequence, institutions that mitigate
or eliminate the moral hazard problem are key determinants of the dissemination of
knowledge and economic growth.4
The “family” in our analysis is the polar case where no enforcement mechanism is avail-
able that reaches beyond the nuclear family, and hence children learn only from their
own parents. In the family equilibrium, there is still some technological progress due
to experimentation with new ideas and innovation within the family, but there is no
dissemination of knowledge, and hence the rate of technological progress is low. The
“clan” is an extended family where reputation and trust provide an informal enforce-
ment mechanism. Hence, children can become apprentices of members of the clan other
than their own parents (such as aunts or uncles). The clan equilibrium leads to faster
technological progress compared to the family equilibrium, because productive new
ideas disseminate within each clan. The “guild” in our model is a coalition of all the
masters in a given trade that provides a semi-formal enforcement mechanism, but also
regulates (monopolizes) apprenticeship within the trade. Finally, the “market” is a for-
mal enforcement institution where an outside authority (such as the state) enforces con-
tracts, and in addition, rules are in place that prevent anticompetitive behavior (such
limitations on the supply of apprenticeship imposed by guilds).
In terms of mapping the model into historical institutions, we regard most world re-
gions (in particular China, India, and the Middle East) as being characterized by the
clan equilibrium throughout the pre-industrial era. Here extended families organized
most aspects of economic life, including the transmission of skills between generations.
The distinctive features of Western Europe are a much larger role of the nuclear family
from the first centuries of the Common Era; little significance of extended families; and
an increasing relevance of institutions that do not rely on family ties (such as cities and
indeed guilds) starting in the Middle Ages. Hence, in the language of the model, we
view Western Europe as undergoing a transition from the family to the guild equilib-
rium during the Middle Ages, and onwards to the market equilibrium in the centuries
leading up to the Industrial Revolution.
To explain the emerging primacy of Western Europe over other world regions, we look
to the comparative growth performance of the clan and guild institutions. Both the
4Additional innovations relative to the recent literature on growth based on the exchange of ideas are
that we examine endogenous institutional change, and that we allow for endogenous population growth.
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clan and the guild provided for apprenticeship outside the nuclear family, and a count
against the guild is the anticompetitive nature of guilds, i.e., the possibility that guilds
limited access to apprenticeship to raise prices. However, our analysis identifies a much
more important force that explains why the Western European system of knowledge
acquisition came to dominate. Namely, apprenticeship within guilds was independent
of family ties, and thus allowed for dissemination of knowledge in the entire economy,
whereas in a clan based system the dissemination of knowledge was impaired. A differ-
ent side of the same coin is that in a clan based system, relatively little is gained by learn-
ing from multiple elders, because given that these elders belong to the same clan, they
are likely to have received the same training and thus to have very similar knowledge.
In contrast, in a guild (and also in the market) family ties do not limit apprenticeship,
and hence the young can sample from a much wider variety of knowledge, implying
that apprenticeship is more productive and knowledge disseminates more quickly. The
historical evidence shows that, indeed, in Europe master and apprentice were far less
likely to be related to each other than elsewhere. Moreover, the guild system sometimes
included specific features, in particular journeymanship, that had the effect of providing
access to a broader range of knowledge and fostering the spread of new techniques and
ideas. In a narrower system based on blood relationships, such a wide exchange of ideas
was not feasible.
Our framework can also be used to explore why institutional change (i.e., the adoption
of guilds and, later on, the market) took place in Europe, but not elsewhere. If adopting
new institutions is costly, the incentive to adopt will be lower when the initial economic
system is relatively more successful, i.e., in a clan-based economy compared to a family-
based economy. If the cost of adopting new institutions declines with population den-
sity, it is possible that new institutions will only be adopted if the economy starts out in
the family equilibrium, but not if the clan equilibrium is the initial condition. We also
discuss complementary mechanisms (going beyond the formal model) that are likely to
have contributed also to faster institutional change in Europe.
The paper engages three recent literatures in economic history that have received con-
siderable attention. One is the debate over whether craft guilds were on balance a
hindrance to technological progress, or whether they stimulated it by supporting ap-
prenticeship relations (for a recent summary, see van Zanden and Prak, eds. 2013b and
Ogilvie 2004). The second new literature is the one emphasizing the ingenuity of arti-
sans and skilled workers in generating knowledge, and minimizing the classic distinc-
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tion between formal science and practical knowledge. Roberts and Schaffer stress the
importance of “local technological projects” carried out by the “tacit genius of on-the-
spot practitioners;” here they clearly refer to thoughtful and well-trained artisans who
advance the frontiers of useful knowledge (Roberts and Schaffer, 2007; see also Long
2011). Little in this literature, however, has focused on the intergenerational transmis-
sion of the knowledge embedded in such “mindful hands” through the institutions of
apprenticeship. The third literature is concerned with understanding economic, insti-
tutional, and cultural differences between Europe and other world regions as a source
of of the relative rise of Europe and decline of other regions in the centuries leading
up to the Industrial Revolution (e.g., Voigtla¨nder and Voth 2013b, 2013a). We build in
particular on the work by Greif and Tabellini (2015) on the role of clans in China versus
“corporations” in Europe (i.e., formal organizations that exist independently of family
ties) for sustaining cooperation (see also Greif 2006 and Greif, Iyigun, and Sasson 2012).
However, Greif and Tabellini do not consider the implications of such institutions for
the generation and dissemination of productive knowledge.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes key historical aspects of appren-
ticeship systems on which we base our theory. Our formal model of knowledge growth
is described in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the different apprenticeship institutions and
derives their implications for economic growth. Section 5 makes use of theoretical re-
sults to analyze the rise of European technological primacy, and considers endogenous
adoption of institutions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Background
2.1 Learning on the Shopfloor
Through most of history, the acquisition of human capital took the form, in the felicitous
phrase of De Munck and Soly (2007), of “learning on the shopfloor.” One should not take
this too literally: some skills had to be learned on board of ships or on the bottom of coal
mines. Yet it remains true that learning took place through personal contact between a
designated “master” and his apprentice.5 As they point out (ibid., p. 6), before the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century there were few alternatives to acquiring useful productive
skills. Some of the better schools, such as Britain’s dissenting academies or the drawing
5We consider an era which is characterized by a sharp division of labor by gender, and where formal
apprenticeship generally was open only to boys. Hence, we will refer to master and apprentice as “he”
throughout the paper, and our model does not distinguish two genders.
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schools that emerged on the European continent around 1600, taught, in addition to the
three R’s, some useful skills such as draftmanship, chemistry, and geography. But on
the whole, the one-on-one learning process was the one experienced by most.6
The economics of apprenticeship in the premodern world is based on the insight that
each master artisan basically produced a set of two connected outputs: a commodity or
service, and new craftsmen. In other words, he sold “human capital.” The economics
of such a setup explains many of the historical features of the system. The best-known,
of course, is that the apprentice had to supply labor services to the master in partial
payment for his training and his room and board. In some instances, this component
became so large that the apprentice contract was more of a labor contract than a training
arrangement.7 Such provisions underline the basic idea of joint production, in which
the two activities—production and training—were strongly complementary.
As Humphries (2003) has pointed out, the contract between the master and the appren-
tice in any institutional setting is problematic in two ways. First, the flows of the services
transacted for is non-synchronic (although the exact timing differed from occupation to
occupation). Second, these flows cannot be fully specified ex ante or observed ex post.
The apprentice, by the very nature of the teaching process, is not in a position to assess
adequately whether he has received what he has paid for until the contract is terminated.
Even if the apprentice himself could observe the implementation of the contract, the de-
tails would be unverifiable for third parties and adjudicators. Because the transaction
is non-repeated, the party who receives the services or payment first has an incentive
to shirk. This is known ex ante, and therefore it is possible that the transaction does
not take place and that the economy would suffer from the serious underproduction
of training.8 However, since that would mean that intergenerational transmission of
knowledge would take place exclusively within families, some societies have come up
with institutions that allowed the contracts to be enforced between unrelated parties.
6Of course, printed material became increasingly widespread after Gutenberg, but played a limited
role in the training of craftsmen. The printing press was relatively more important for providing access
to science and and similar “top end” knowledge; see Dittmar (2011) for an analysis of the overall impact
of printing on early economic growth.
7Steffens (2001), pp. 124–25, observes on the basis of nineteenth century Belgian apprentices that little
explicit teaching was carried out and that the learning was simply occurring through the performance of
tasks.
8The suggestion by Epstein (2008, p. 61) that the contract could be rewritten to prevent either side from
defaulting is not persuasive. For instance, he suggests that by backloading some of the payments from
master to apprentice, the latter would be deterred from defecting early—but that of course just shifts the
opportunity to cheat from the apprentice to the master.
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These institutions curbed opportunistic behavior in different ways, but they all required
some kind of credible punishment. As we will see in our theoretical analysis below, the
more sophisticated and effective institutions led to better quality of training (in a precise
matter we will define) and thus led to faster technological progress.
2.2 Apprenticeship in Western Europe
The evidence suggests that at least in early modern Europe the market for apprentice-
ship functioned reasonably well, despite the obvious dangers of market failure. A good
indicator of the working of the market for human capital, at least in Britain, was the
premium that parents paid to a master. Occupations that demanded more skill and
promised higher lifetime earnings commanded higher premiums. The differences in
premiums meant that this market worked, in the sense that the apprenticeship premium
seems to have varied positively with the expected profitability and prestige of the cho-
sen occupation (Brooks 1994, p. 60). As noted by Minns and Wallis (2013), the premium
paid was not a full payment equal to the present value of the training plus room and
board, which usually were much higher than the upfront premium. The rest normally
was paid in kind with the labor provided by the apprentice. The premium served more
than one purpose. In part, it was to insure the master against the risk of an early de-
parture of the apprentice. But in part it reflected also the quality of the training and the
cost to the master, as well as its scarcity value (ibid., p. 340). More recently, it has been
shown that the premium worked as a market price reflecting rising and falling demand
for certain occupations resulting from technological shocks (Ben Zeev, Mokyr, and Van
Der Beek 2015). It is telling that not all apprentices paid the premiums: whereas 74 per-
cent of engravers in London paid a premium in London, only 17 percent of blacksmiths
did (Minns and Wallis, 2013, p. 344). If an impecunious apprentice could not pay, he
had the option of committing to a longer indenture, as was the case in seventeenth cen-
tury Vienna (Steidl, 2007, p. 143). In eighteenth century Augsburg a telling example is
that a “big strong man was often taken on without having to pay any apprenticeship
premium, whereas a small weak man would have to pay more.” It is also recorded that
apprentices with poor parents who could not afford the premium would end up being
trained by a master who did inferior work (Reith, 2007, p.183). This market worked in
sophisticated ways, and it is clear is that human capital was recognized to be a valuable
commodity. The formal contract signed by the apprentice in the seventeenth century
included a commitment to protect the master’s secrets and not to abscond, as well as to
not commit fornication (Smith, 1973, p. 150).
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The precise operation of apprenticeship varied a great deal. The duration of the contract
depended above all on the complexity of the trade to be learned, but also on the age
at which youngsters started their apprenticeship. On the continent three to four years
seems to have been the norm (De Munck and Soly, 2007, p. 18). As would perhaps
be expected, there is evidence that the duration of contracts grew over the centuries as
techniques became more complex and the division of labor more specialized as a result
of technological progress (Reith 2007, p. 183).
To what extent was the master-apprentice contract actually enforced? Historians have
found that a substantial number of contracts were not completed (De Munck and Soly,
2007 p. 10). Wallis (2008, pp. 839-40) has shown that in late seventeenth century Lon-
don a substantial number of apprentices left their original master before completing the
seven mandated years of their apprenticeship. The main reason was that the rigid seven
year duration stipulated by the 1562 Statute of Artificers (which regulated apprentice-
ship) was rarely enforced, as were most other stipulations contained in that law (Dun-
lop, 1911, 1912).9 As Wallis (2008, p. 854) remarks, “like many other areas of premodern
regulation, the tidy hierarchy of the seven-year apprenticeship leading to mastery was
more ideal than reality.” Rather than an indication of contractual failure, the large num-
ber of apprentices that did not “complete” their terms indicates a greater flexibility in
Britain. Moreover, many of them quit during their terms, and given the relatively small
number of lawsuits filed against such apprentices (Rushton 1991, p. 94) it seems that
many of the early departures were by mutual consent (see also Wallis 2008, p. 844).
The flexibility of the contracts in pre-Industrial Revolution England limited the risk each
contracting party faced from the opportunistic behavior of the other. This institution,
then, would be more successful in terms of transmitting existing skills between gen-
erations in an efficient manner. Once an apprentice had mastered a skill, there would
be little point in staying on. Moreover, in many documented cases apprentices were
“turned over” to another master—by some calculation this was true of 22 percent of all
apprentices who did not complete their term (Wallis, 2008, pp. 842-43). There could be
many reasons for this, of course, including the master falling sick or being otherwise
indisposed. But also, at least some apprentices might have found that their master did
not teach them best practice techniques or that the trade they were learning was not as
remunerative as some other.
9For a more nuanced view, see Davies 1956, who argues that enforcement was a function of the eco-
nomic circumstances, but agrees that there is little evidence of apprentices being sued or denied the right
to exercise their occupation for having served fewer than seven years.
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The exact mechanics of the skill transmission process are hard to nail down. After all, the
knowledge being taught was tacit, and mostly consisted of imitation and learning-by-
doing. It surely differed a great deal from occupation to occupation. Moreover, our own
knowledge is biased to some extent by the better availability of more recent sources. All
the same, Steffens (2001) has suggested that much of the learning occurred through ap-
prentices “stealing with their eyes” (p. 131) – meaning that they learned mostly through
observation, imitation, and experimentation. The tasks to which apprentices were put
at first, insofar that they can be documented at all, seem to have consisted of rather me-
nial assignments such as making deliveries, cleaning and guarding the shop. Only at a
later stage would an apprentice be trusted with more sensitive tasks involving valued
customers and expensive raw materials (Lane, 1996, p. 77). Yet they spent most of their
waking hours in the presence of the master and possibly more experienced apprentices
and journeymen, and as they aged they gradually would be trusted with more advanced
tasks.10
One of the most interesting findings of the new research on apprenticeship, which is
central to the theory developed below, is that in Europe family ties were relatively less
important than elsewhere in the world, such as India (Roy, 2013, pp. 71, 77). In China,
guilds existed, but were organized along clan lines and it is within those boundaries that
apprenticeship took place (Moll-Murata, 2013, p. 234). In contrast, Europeans came to
organize themselves along professional lines without the dependence on kinship (Lu-
cassen, de Moor, and van Zanden, 2008, p. 16). Comparing China and Europe, van Zan-
den and Prak (2013a) write: “In China, training was provided by relatives, and hence a
narrow group of experts, instead of the much wider training opportunities provided by
many European guilds.” The contrast between Asia and Europe in systems of knowl-
edge transmission is also emphasized by van Zanden (2009): “We can distinguish two
different ways to organize such training: in large parts of the world the family or the clan
played a central role, and skills were transferred from fathers to sons or other members
of the (extended) family. In fact, in parts of Asia, being a craftsman was largely heredi-
tary . . . . In contrast to the relatively closed systems in which the family played a central
role, Western Europe had a formal system of apprenticeship—organized by guilds or
similar institutions—and in principle open to all.” In Western Europe, despite the fact
10Wallis (2008, p. 849) compares the process with what happens in more modern days amongst minaret
builder apprentices in Yemen: “instruction is implicit and fragmented, questions are rarely posed, and
reprimands rather than corrections form the majority of feedback.” De Munck makes a similar point
when he writes that “masters were merely expected to point out what had gone wrong and what might
be improved” (cited in De Munck and Soly 2007, p. 16 and p. 79).
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that within the guilds the sons of masters received preferential treatment and that train-
ing with a relative resolved to a large extent the contractual problems, following in the
footsteps of the parents gradually fell out of favor (Epstein and Prak 2008, p. 10). The
examples of Johann Sebastian Bach and Leopold Mozart notwithstanding, fewer and
fewer boys were trained by their fathers. By the seventeenth century, apprentices who
were trained by relatives were a distinct minority, estimated in London to be somewhere
between 7 and 28 percent (Leunig, Minns, and Wallis 2011, p. 42). Prak (2013, p. 153)
has calculated that in the bricklaying industry, fewer than ten percent continued their
fathers’ trades. This may have been a decisive factor in the evolution of apprenticeship
as a market phenomenon in Europe, but not elsewhere.11
2.3 Mobility and the Diffusion of Knowledge
In premodern Europe, as early as fifteenth century Flanders, artisans were mobile. In
England, such mobility was particularly pronounced (Leunig, Minns, and Wallis 2011),
with lads from all over Britain seeking to apprentice in London, not least of all the young
James Watt and Joseph Whitworth, two heroes of the Industrial Revolution. But as Sta-
bel (2007, p. 159) notes, towns and their guilds had to accept and acknowledge skills
acquired elsewhere, even if they insisted that newcomers adapt to local economic stan-
dards set by the guilds. Constraints were more pronounced on the continent, but even
here apprentices came to urban centers from smaller towns or rural regions (De Munck
and Soly, 2007, p. 17), and mobility of artisans and the skills they carried with them
extended to all of Europe.
The idea of the “journeyman” or “traveling companion” was that after completing their
training, new artisans would travel to another city to acquire additional skills before
they would qualify as masters—much like postdoctoral students today (Lis, Soly, and
Mitzman 1994, Robert 1979). As such, journeymanship was traditionally the “inter-
mediate stage” between completing an apprenticeship and starting off as a fullfledged
master. Journeymen and apprentices are known to have traveled extensively as early
as the fourteenth century, often on a seasonal basis, a practice known as “tramping.”
By the early modern period, this practice was fully institutionalized in Central Europe
(Epstein, 2013, p. 59). Itinerant journeymen, Epstein argues, learned a variety of tech-
niques practiced in different regions and were instrumental in spreading best-practice
11The cases of Japan and the Ottoman Empire are less clear cut; guilds clearly played some role here
(see Nagata 2007, 2008, Yildirim 2008), but less is known about their role for organizing apprenticeship
and the importance of family ties in the selection of apprentices.
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techniques. Towns that believed to enjoy technological superiority forbade the prac-
tice of tramping and made apprentices swear not to practice their trades anywhere else,
as with Nuremberg metal workers and Venetian glassmakers (ibid., pp. 60-61). Such
prohibitions were ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.
Not every apprentice had to go through journeymanship, and relatively little is known
about how long it lasted and how it was contracted for. Journeymen have been re-
garded by much of the literature as employees of masters, and were often organized in
compagnonnages which frequently clashed with employers. Journeymen in many cases
were highly skilled workers, but more mobile than masters. Known as “travellers” or
“tramps,” they often chose to bypass the formal status of master but prided themselves
on their skills, considering themselves “equal partners” to masters (Lis, Soly, and Mitz-
man 1994, p. 19). Their mobility lent itself to the creation of networks in the same lines of
work, and it stands to reason that technical information flowed fairly freely along those
channels of communication. But skilled masters, too, traveled across Europe, often de-
liberately attracted by mercantilist states or local governments keen to promote their
manufacturing industries through the recruitment of high-quality artisans. Technology
diffusion occurred largely through the migration of skilled workers, or through appren-
tices traveling to learn from the most renowned masters (and then returning home).
Interestingly, such migration seems to have focused mostly on towns in which the in-
dustry already existed and which were ready to upgrade their production techniques
(Belfanti 2004, p. 581).
2.4 Apprenticeship and Guilds
There has been a lively debate in the past two decades about the role of the guilds in
premodern European economies. Traditionally relegated by an earlier literature to be
a set of conservative, rent-seeking clubs, a revisionist literature has tried to rehabilitate
craft guilds as agents of progress and technological innovation. Part of that storyline
has been that guilds were instrumental in the smooth functioning of apprenticeships.
As noted, given the potential for market failure due to incomplete contracts, incentive
incompatibility, and poor information, agreements on intergenerational transmission of
skills needed enforcement, regulation, and supervision. In a setting of weak political
systems, the guilds stepped in and created a governance system that was functional
and productive (Epstein and Prak 2008; Lucassen, de Moor, and van Zanden 2008; van
Zanden and Prak 2013b). In a posthumously published essay, Epstein stated that the
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details of the apprenticeship contract had to be enforced through the craft guilds, which
“overcame the externalities in human capital formation” by punishing both masters and
apprentices who violated their contracts (Epstein 2013, pp. 31-32). The argument has
been criticized by Ogilvie (2014, 2016). Others, too, have found cases in which the nexus
between guilds and apprenticeships proposed by Epstein and his followers does not
quite hold up (Davids, 2003, 2007).
The reality is that some studies support Epstein’s view to some extent, and others do not.
The heated polemics have made the more committed advocates of both positions state
their arguments in more extreme terms than they can defend. Guilds were institutions
that existed through many centuries, in hundreds of towns, and for many occupations.
This three-dimensional matrix had a huge number of elements, and it stands to reason
that things differed over time, place, and occupation.
Most scholars find themselves somewhere in between. Guilds were at times hostile to
innovation, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and under the pre-
text of protecting quality they collected exclusionary rents by longer apprenticeships
and limited membership. But in some cases, such as the Venetian glass and silk indus-
tries, guilds encouraged innovation (Belfanti 2004, p. 576). Their attitude to training,
similarly, differed a great deal over space and time. Davids (2013, p. 217), for instance,
finds that in the Netherlands “guilds normally did not intervene in the conditions, regis-
tration, or supervision of [apprenticeship] contracts.” Unger (2013, p. 203), after a metic-
ulous survey, must conclude that the “precise role of guilds in the long term evolution
of shipbuilding technology remains unclear.” Moll-Murata (2013, p. 256), in comparing
the porcelain industries in the Netherlands and China, retreats to a position that “con-
trasting the guild rehabilitationist [Epstein’s] and the guild-critical positions is difficult
to defend . . . we find arguments supporting both propositions.”
Guilds and apprenticeship overlapped, but they did not strictly require each other, espe-
cially not after 1600. Apprenticeship contracts could find alternative enforcement mech-
anisms to guilds. In the Netherlands local organizations named neringen were estab-
lished by local government to regulate and supervise certain industries independently
of the guilds. They set many of the terms of the apprenticeship contract, often the length
of contract and other details (Davids, 2007, p. 71). Even more strikingly, in Britain, most
guilds gradually declined after 1600 and exercised little control over training procedures
(Berlin, 2008). Moreover, informal institutions and reputation mechanisms in many
places helped make apprenticeship work even in the absence of guilds. As Humphries
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(2003) argues, apprenticeship contracts in England may have been, to a large extent, self-
enforcing in that opportunistic behavior in fairly well-integrated local societies would
be punished severely by an erosion of reputation. Market relationships were linked to
social relationships, and such linkages are a strong incentive toward cooperative behav-
ior (Spagnolo 1999). For example, a master found to treat apprentices badly might not
only lose future apprentices, but also damage relations with his customers and suppli-
ers. The same was true for the apprentices, whose future careers would be damaged
if they were known to have reneged on contracts. If both master and apprentice ex-
pected this in advance, in equilibrium they would not engage in opportunistic behavior
and would try to make their relationship as harmonious as possible. The limits to such
self-enforcing contracts are obvious. Mobility of apprentices after training would mean
that the the reach of reputation was limited, and in larger communities the reputation
mechanism would be ineffective. Substantial opportunistic behavior could cause the
cooperative equilibrium to unravel.
All the same, it has been stressed that despite the convincing evidence that guilds in
some cases helped in the formation of human capital and supported innovation, the two
economies in which technological progress was the fastest after 1600 were the Nether-
lands and Britain, the two countries in which guilds were relatively weak (Ogilvie, 2016).
That such a correlation does not establish causation goes without saying, but it does
serve to warn us against embracing the revisionist view of guilds too rashly.
In the theory articulated below, the growth implications of the guild system can be as-
sessed according to their next best alternative. If the state is sufficiently strong to enforce
contracts and enable apprenticeship without guilds being involved, the anticompeti-
tive aspect of guilds dominates, and thus guilds hinder growth (consistent with faster
growth in the Netherlands and Britain after 1600, when the state increasingly took over
functions once served by guilds and cities). But when the state is weak, and the choice
is between apprenticeship provided via guilds or via clans, the faster dissemination of
knowledge associated with guilds dominates. We now turn to the theory that spells out
these results in a formal model of knowledge transmission.
3 A Model of Pre-industrial Knowledge Growth
In this section, we develop an explicit model of knowledge creation and transmission in
a pre-industrial setting. By pre-industrial, we mean that aggregate production relies on
a land-based technology that exhibits decreasing returns to the size of the population.
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In addition, there is a positive feedback from income per capita to population growth,
implying that the economy is subject to Malthusian constraints. Compared to existing
Malthusian models, the main novelty here is that we explicitly model the transmission
of knowledge from generation to generation and the resulting technological progress.
This allows us to to analyze how institutions affect the transmission of knowledge, and
how this interacts with the usual forces present in a Malthusian economy.
3.1 Preferences, Production, and the Productivity of Craftsmen
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of people who live two
periods, childhood and adulthood. All decisions are made by adults, whose preferences
are given by the utility function:
u(c, I′) = c + γ I′, (1)
where c is the adult’s consumption and I′ is the total future labor income of this adult’s
children. The parameter γ > 0 captures altruism towards children. The role of altruism
is to motivate parents’ investment in their children’s knowledge.
The adults work as craftsmen in a variety of trades. At the beginning of a period, the
aggregate economy is characterized by two state variables: the number of craftsmen
N, and the amount of knowledge k in the economy. Craftsmen are heterogeneous in
productivity, and knowledge k determines the average productivity of craftsmen in a
way that we make precise below. We start by describing how aggregate output in our
economy depends on the state variables N and k.
The single consumption good (which we interpret as a composite of food and manu-
factured goods) is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant
return to scale that uses land X and effective craftsmen’s labor L as inputs:
Y = L1−αXα, (2)
with α ∈ (0, 1). The total amount of land is normalized to one, X = 1. Land is owned
by craftsmen.12
12Our main results would be identical if a separate class of landowners were introduced. The model
abstracts from an explicit farming sector; however, it would be straightforward to include farm labor as
an additional factor of production (see Appendix A), or alternatively we can interpret some of the adults
who we refer to as craftsmen as farmers.
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The effective labor supply by craftsmen L is a CES aggregate of effective labor supplied









with λ > 1. The elasticity of substitution between the different trades is λ/(λ− 1). The
distinction among different trades of craftsmen (watchmaker, wheelwright, blacksmith
etc.) is important for our analysis of guilds below, which we model as coalitions of the
craftsmen in a given trade. However, the equilibrium supply of effective labor will turn
out to be the same in all trades, so that Lj = L for all j. For most of our analysis, we can
therefore suppress the distinction between trades from the notation.
We now relate the supply of effective labor by craftsmen L in efficiency units to the
number of craftsmen N and the state of knowledge k. Craftsmen are heterogenous in
knowledge. The productive knowledge of a craftsman i is measured by a cost param-
eter hi, where a lower hi implies that the master can produce at lower cost and hence
has more productive knowledge. Intuitively, different craftsmen may apply different
methods and techniques in their production, which vary in productivity. Specifically,
the output qi of a craftsman with knowledge hi is given by:
qi = h−θi . (4)
The final-goods technology (2) is operated by a competitive industry. Given the Cobb-
Douglas production function, this implies that craftsmen receive share 1− α of total out-
put as compensation for their labor, and consequently the labor income of a craftsman
supplying qi efficiency units of craftsmen’s labor is:
Ii = qi (1− α) YL . (5)
The heterogeneity in the cost parameter hi among craftsmen takes the specific form of
an exponential distribution with distribution parameter k:
hi ∼ Exp(k).
Given the exponential distribution, the expectation of hi is given byE [hi] = k−1. Hence,
higher knowledge k corresponds to a lower average cost hi and therefore higher pro-
ductivity. We assume that the same k applies to all trades. Given the exponential distri-
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bution for hi and (4), output qi follows a Fre´chet distribution with shape parameter 1/k
and scale parameter 1/θ.
We can now express the total supply of effective labor by craftsmen as a function of state
variables. The average output across craftsmen is given by:
q = E (qi) =
∫ ∞
0




t−1 exp(−x)dx is the Euler gamma function. The total supply of
effective craftsmen’s labor L is then given by the expected output per craftsman E (qi)
multiplied by the number of craftsmen N:
L = N kθ Γ(1− θ). (7)







= Γ(1− θ)1−α k(1−α)θ N−α. (8)
3.2 Population Growth and the Malthusian Constraint
So far, we have described how total output (and hence output per adult) depends on the
aggregate state variables N and k. Next, we specify how these state variables evolve over
time. We start with population growth. Consistent with evidence from pre-industrial
economies (see Ashraf and Galor 2011), the model allows for Malthusian dynamics.13
The presence of land in the aggregate production function implies decreasing returns
for the remaining factor L, which gives rise to a Malthusian tradeoff between the size of
the population and income per capita. The second ingredient for generating Malthusian
dynamics is a positive feedback from income per capita to population growth. While
often this relationship is modeled through optimal fertility choice,14 we opt for a simpler
mechanism of an aggregate feedback from income per capita to mortality rates. Every
13Empirical work has found both a fertility and a mortality link to income per capita in medieval Eng-
land, but gradually weakening over time (Kelly and O´ Gra´da 2012 and 2014). The “fundamentalist”
Malthusian assumption that all productivity gains eventually are translated into population growth so
that the “iron law” holds fully is made here for simplification; our results for institutional comparisons
would be similar in a framework that allows for growing income per capita even in the long term.
14Fertility preferences can be motivated through parental altruism (Barro and Becker 1989 and applied
in a Malthusian context by Doepke 2004, among others) or through direct preferences over the quantity
and quality of children (e.g., Galor and Weil 2000 and de la Croix and Doepke 2003).
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adult gives birth to a fixed number n¯ > 1 of children. The fraction of children that
survives to adulthood depends on aggregate output per adult y, namely:
n = n¯ min [1, s y] . (9)
Here min[1, s y] is the fraction of surviving children, and n is the number of surviving
children per adult. This function captures that low living standards (e.g., malnutrition)
make people (and in particular children) more susceptible to transmitted diseases, so
that low income per capita is associated with more frequent deadly epidemics. In recent
times, we can also envision s to depend on medical technology (i.e., the invention of
antibiotics would raise s). However, given that we analyze preindustrial growth, we
will assume that s is fixed. We will also focus attention on a phase of development
where the mortality tradeoff is still operative, so that survival is less than certain and
n = n¯s y. The law of motion for population then is:
N′ = n N = n¯ s y N = n¯ s Y.
Consider a balanced growth path in which the stock of knowledge k grows according to





In such a balanced growth path, the Malthusian features of the model economy impose
a relationship between growth in knowledge g and population growth n, as shown in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (The Malthusian Constraint).
Along a balanced growth path, the growth factor of technology g and the growth factor of popu-
lation n satisfy:
gθ(1−α) = nα. (10)
Proof. Income per capita y is given by (8). Along a balanced growth path, y is constant,
and hence (10) has to hold in order to keep the right-hand side of (8) constant, too. 
The Malthusian constraint states that faster technological progress is linked to higher
population growth. Given (10), a faster rate of technological progress is also associ-
ated with a higher level of income per capita. Income per capita is constant in any
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balanced growth path: Malthusian dynamics rule out sustained growth in living stan-
dards, because accelerating population growth ultimately would overwhelm productiv-
ity growth. Instead, economies with faster accumulation of knowledge will be charac-
terized by faster population growth and hence, over time, increasing population density.
3.3 Apprenticeship, Innovation, and the Evolution of Knowledge
We now turn to the accumulation of knowledge in our model economy. In a given pe-
riod, all productive knowledge is embodied in the adult workers. During childhood,
people have to acquire the productive knowledge of the previous generation. There
are two sources of increasing knowledge across generations. First, craftsmen are het-
erogeneous in their productive knowledge. Young craftsmen can learn from multiple
adult craftsmen, and then apply the best of what they have learned. This knowledge
dissemination process results in endogenous technological progress. In addition, after
having acquired knowledge from the elders, young craftsmen can innovate, i.e., gener-
ate an idea that may improve on what they have learned, resulting in a second source of
technological progress.
In order to model the idea that apprentices (or their parents) are subject to imperfect
information on the efficiency of the different masters, we assume that the young can
observe the efficiency of masters only by working with them as apprentices. Consider
an apprentice who learns from m masters indexed from 1 to m (the choice of m will be
discussed below). The efficiency hL learned during the apprenticeship process is:
hL(m) = min {h1, h2, . . . , hm} . (11)
Hence, apprentices acquire the cost parameter of the most efficient (i.e., lowest cost)
master they have learned from. After learning from masters, craftsmen attempt to in-
novate by generating a new idea characterized by cost parameter hN. The quality of the
idea is random, and it may be better or worse than what they already know. As adult
craftsmen, they use the highest efficiency they have attained either through learning
from elders or through innovation, so that the final cost parameter h′ is given by:
h′ = min {hL, hN} . (12)
As will become clear below, the model can generate sustained growth even if the rate
of innovation is zero (i.e., own ideas are always inferior to acquired knowledge). In
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that case, the dissemination process of existing ideas is solely responsible for growth.
However, allowing for innovation allows for a positive rate of productivity growth even
if each child learns only from a single master.
Recall that the distribution of the hi among adult craftsmen is exponential with distri-
bution parameter k. The distribution of new ideas is also exponential, and the quality of
new ideas depends on existing average knowledge:
hN ∼ Exp(νk).
That is, the more craftsmen already know, the better the quality of the new ideas gener-
ated. The parameter ν measures relative importance of transmitted knowledge and new
ideas. If ν is close to zero, most craftsmen rely on existing knowledge, and if ν is large,
innovation rather than the dissemination of existing ideas through apprenticeship is the
key driver of knowledge.
The exponential distributions for ideas imply that, given the knowledge accumulation
process described by (11) and (12), the knowledge distribution preserves its shape over
time (as in Lucas 2009). Specifically, if each young craftsman learns from m masters that
are drawn at random we have:15
hL = min {h1, h2, . . . , hm} ∼ Exp(mk),
h′ = min {hL, hN} ∼ Exp(mk + νk).
Hence, with m randomly chosen masters per apprentice, aggregate knowledge k evolves
according to:
k′ = (m + ν)k. (13)
The market for apprenticeship interacts with population growth. In particular, if each
master takes on a apprentices, and each apprentice learns from m masters, the condition
for matching demand and supply of apprenticeships is:
N′m = N a. (14)
15This result follows from the min stability property of the exponential distribution. In particular, if ha
and hb are independent exponentially distributed random variables with rates ka and kb, then min[ha, hb]
is exponentially distributed with rate ka + kb.
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We ignore integer constraints and treat m and a as continuous variables. Below, we will
focus on equilibria where each apprentice chooses the same number of masters m, and
each master has the same number of apprentices a.
We now arrive at the core of our analysis, namely the question of how the number and
identity of masters for each apprentice are determined. Apprenticeship is associated
with costs and benefits. While working as an apprentice with a master, each apprentice
produces κ > 0 units of the consumption good (this is in addition to the output gen-
erated by the aggregate production function). This output is controlled by the master.
In turn, a master who teaches a apprentices incurs a utility cost δ(a), where δ(0) = 0,
δ′(a) > 0, and δ′′(a) > 0 (i.e., the cost is increasing and convex in a). Incurring this cost
is necessary for transmitting knowledge to the apprentices. We assume for simplicity
that the function δ(·) is quadratic, i.e. δ(a) = δ¯2 a2.
If a master takes on a apprentices but then puts no effort into teaching, the apprentices
still generate output κa by assisting the master in production. Thus, there is a moral haz-
ard problem: Masters may be tempted to take on apprentices, appropriate production
κa, but not actually teach, saving the cost δ(a).
Dealing with this moral hazard problem is a key challenge for an effective system of
knowledge transmission. The danger of moral hazard is especially severe here because
the very nature of apprenticeship defines it as the quintessential incomplete contract
(see Section 2). In a modern market economy, we envision that such problems are dealt
with by a centralized system of contract enforcement. In such a system, a parent would
write contracts with masters to take on the children as apprentices. A price would be
agreed on that is mutually agreeable given the cost of training apprentices and the par-
ent’s desire, given altruistic preferences (1), to provide the children with future income.
Courts would ensure that both parties hold up their end of the bargain.
In pre-industrial societies lacking an effective system of contract enforcement, other in-
stitutions would have to ensure an effective transmission of knowledge from the elders
to the young. Our view is that variation in these alternative institutions across coun-
tries and world regions plays a central role in shaping economic success and failure in
the pre-industrial era. After a brief discussion of model assumptions, we analyze spe-
cific, historically relevant institutions in the context of our model of knowledge-driven
growth.
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3.4 Discussion of Model Assumptions
Our model of growth in the pre-industrial economy is stylized and relies on a set of
specific assumptions that yield a tractable analysis. We conclude our description of the
model with a discussion of the role and plausibility of the assumptions that are most
central to our overall argument.
Most importantly, apprenticeship institutions matter in our economy because the knowl-
edge of masters is not publicly observable. This creates the incentive for apprentices
to sample the knowledge of multiple masters to gain productive knowledge, and im-
plies that institutions that determine how apprentices are matched to masters matter for
growth. To maintain tractability, in the model the lack of information on productivity is
severe: Nothing at all is known about the productivity of different masters, even though
there is wide variation in their actual productivity. Taken at face value, this assumption
is clearly implausible. However, possible concerns about its role can be addressed in
two ways.
First, in our model all knowledge differences between masters are actual productivity
differences, i.e., masters who know more produce more. A realistic alternative possibil-
ity is that at least some variation in knowledge is in terms of “latent” productivity, i.e.,
some masters may know techniques and methods that will turn out to be highly pro-
ductive and important at a later time when combined with other knowledge, but do not
give a productivity advantage in the present. A well known example are the inventions
of Leonardo da Vinci which could not be implemented given the knowledge of his age,
but which turned into productive knowledge centuries later. Similarly, the success of
the steam engine was based in large part on a set of gradual improvements in craftmen’s
ability to work metal to precise specifications; for instance, steam engines work only if
the piston can move easily in the cylinder but with a tight fit. Many improvements in
techniques would have been of comparatively little value when first invented, but then
became critical later on. Along these lines, in Appendix B we describe an extension
of our model where a craftsman’s output can be constrained by the state of aggregate
knowledge. This version leads to exactly the same implications as the simpler setup
described here, but actual variation in productivity is much smaller than variation in
latent productivity, so that imperfect information on underlying productivity appears
more plausible.
Second, it would be possible to relax the assumption of total lack of information about
productivity, and instead assume that an informative, but imperfect, signal of each mas-
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ter’s productivity was available.16 In such a setting, more productive masters could
command higher prices for apprenticeships, they would employ a larger number of ap-
prentices, and the spread of productive knowledge would be faster. As we document
in Section 2, the historical evidence for Europe suggests that, indeed, more productive
and knowledgeable masters were able to command higher prices and attract more ap-
prentices. However, as long as information on productivity is less than perfect, the basic
tradeoffs articulated by our analysis and the comparative growth implications of the
institutions analyzed below would be the same. Less-than-perfect information about
productivity is highly plausible; even in today’s world of instant communication and
online discussion boards, for example, graduate students do not have perfect informa-
tion about which advisor will be the best match for them. We adopt the extreme case of
complete lack of observability for tractability; without this assumption the distribution
of knowledge would not preserve its shape over time, so that we would have to rely on
numerical simulation for all results.17
In addition, the master-apprentice relationship in the model is simplified compared to
reality. We use a setting with one-sided moral hazard, i.e., masters can cheat appren-
tices, but not vice versa. In reality, moral hazard was a major concern on both sides of
the master-apprentice relationship. This assumption is introduced merely to simplify
the analysis. It would be straightforward to introduce two-sided moral hazard in our
setting, and the role of institutions for mitigating moral hazard would be unchanged.
Finally, in the model apprentices interact in the same way with all masters they learn
from, and they make a one-time choice of the number of masters to learn from. As
ever, reality is substantially more complicated; choices of whom to learn from unfolded
sequentially over time, and apprentices generally did only one full apprenticeship, fol-
lowed by other shorter interactions during journeymanship. Once again, these assump-
tions are for simplicity and tractability, but are not central to our main results regarding
the role of institutions for knowledge transmission. The key point in the theoretical
setup is that apprentices are able to observe the efficiency of multiple masters and adopt
the techniques of the most efficient master. It is not necessary that apprentices spend
16See Jovanovic (2014) for a study where a signal of skill is available, and assortative matching of young
and old workers is an important driver of growth.
17Luttmer (2015) provides an alternative approach for modeling the assignment of students to teach-
ers. Luttmer’s model has the advantage of allowing for observability and not relying on an unbounded
support of existing knowledge, albeit at the cost of a considerably more complex analysis.
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equal time with each master; in reality, an interaction may be brief and end once an ap-
prentice ascertains that a given master has nothing new to offer. The model abstracts
from such differentiated interactions and imposes symmetrical master-apprentice rela-
tions to improve tractability. Having said that, when matching the model to data, care
should be taken to account for the fact that “apprenticeships” in the model correspond
to a wider range of interactions in reality.
4 Comparing Institutions for Knowledge Transmission
The crucial question in our theory is how the moral hazard problem inherent in ap-
prenticeship is resolved. If masters do not make an effort to teach their apprentices,
parents will have no incentive to send children to learn from masters outside the family.
Apprentices would not learn anything, whereas masters would gain the apprentices’
production κ. Parents would be better off keeping children at home, thereby keeping
output κ in the family. Thus, for apprenticeship outside the immediate family to be fea-
sible (and thus for knowledge to disseminate), an enforcement mechanism is required
in order to provide incentives for masters to exert effort.
4.1 Centralized versus Decentralized Institutions
We consider two types of institutions, characterized by centralized versus decentralized
enforcement. Under centralized enforcement, people can write contracts specifying that
the master must put in effort (and indicating the price of apprenticeship), and there is
a centralized system (such as courts) that punishes anyone who breaks a contract. In
contrast, in a decentralized system no such central authority exists, and instead people
have to form coalitions to maintain a sufficient threat of punishment to resolve the moral
hazard problem.18
To allow for the possibility of decentralized enforcement, we assume that each adult
can inflict a utility cost (damage) on any other adult.19 However, the punishment that
a single adult can mete out is not sufficient to induce a master to put in effort, i.e., the
punishment is lower than the cost of training a single apprentice. In contrast, coalitions
18We should note that in reality, the distinction between centralized and decentralized institutions is
less sharp than in our theory. Even where centralized enforcement institutions existed, they were often
complemented by a self-enforcing mechanism based on trust and reputation (Humphries 2003; Mokyr
2008).
19The cost can be interpreted as physical punishment, as destruction of property, or as spreading rumors
that induce others not to buy from the individual in question.
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of people can always make threats that are sufficient to guarantee compliance. An effec-
tive threat of punishment therefore requires coordination among parents. Coordination,
in turn, requires communication: For a master’s shirking to have consequences, the fact
of the shirking has to be communicated to all would-be punishers. Thus, the extent to
which people are able to communicate with each other partly determines how much
knowledge transmission is possible.
Over time, societies have differed in the extent and manner in which individuals were
connected in communication networks. We consider two different scenarios for decen-
tralized enforcement, the “family” and the “clan,” which we consider particularly rel-
evant for contrasting Europe during the Early Middle Ages with China, India, and the
Middle East during the same period and beyond.
The decentralized systems correspond to a period when centralized enforcement was
not yet sufficiently effective. Even if courts existed, contract enforcement was often
costly, slow, and uncertain. More importantly, for centuries the reach of the state and
hence its courts was severely limited. Europe, for example, used to consist of hundreds
of independent sovereign entities, and the enforcement of the law outside one’s imme-
diate surroundings (say, the city of residence) was weak. With this in mind, the first
centralized enforcement institution that we consider is organized not by the state but by
a coalition of all the masters in a given trade: a “guild.” The guild monitors the behavior
of its members and enforces the apprenticeship contracts between parents and masters.
However, the guild also has anti-competitive features. It can set the price of apprentice-
ship, thereby exploiting its monopoly in a given trade. Guilds played a central role in
European economic life during the Middle Ages, and our theory will allow us to assess
their implications for knowledge creation and dissemination.
The final institution that we consider is the “market,” where there is a centralized en-
forcement system for all trades as in a modern market economy. Importantly, under
this institution the government not only enforces contracts, but also prevents collusion;
trades are no longer allowed to form guilds that limit entry and lower competition, and
both parents and masters act as price takers. The market institution corresponds to the
final stages of the pre-industrial economy, when in Europe nation states became power-
ful and increasingly abolished the traditional privileges of guilds.
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4.2 The Family
Decentralized institutions enforce apprenticeship agreements through the formation of
coalitions of parents that coordinate on a sufficient threat of punishment for shirking
masters. Different decentralized institutions are distinguished by the size of these coali-
tions and the identity of their members. For the formation of a coalition to be feasible,
the members have to be able to communicate with each other about the behavior of
masters. Hence, one polar case is where members of different families are unable to
communicate with each other, so that no coalitions can be formed. The lack of com-
munication rules out coordinating on punishing shirking masters. As a consequence,
apprenticeship outside the immediate family is impossible, i.e., each child learns only
from the parent. In principle, the moral hazard problem is present even within the fam-
ily. However, in utility (1) parents care about their own children, and we assume that the
degree of altruism γ is sufficiently high for parents never to shirk when teaching their
own children. The result is a “family equilibrium,” i.e., an equilibrium where knowl-
edge is transmitted only within dynasties, but there is no dissemination of knowledge
across dynasties.
Formally, under decentralized institutions we model the knowledge accumulation de-
cisions as a game between the craftsmen of a given generation. The strategy of a given
craftsman has three elements:
1. Decide whether to send own children to others as apprentices for training, and if
so, which compensation to pay the masters of one’s children.
2. Decide whether to exploit one’s own apprentices (if any).
3. Decide whom to punish (if anyone).
We focus on Nash equilibria.20 The strategy profile for the family equilibrium is as
follows:
• All craftsmen train their children on their own.
• If (off the equilibrium path) a master gets someone else’s child as an apprentice,
the master exploits the apprentice.
• No one ever punishes anyone.
20Given that there are subsequent generations, one could also define a dynamic game involving all
generations. However, given that preferences are of the warm-glow type, decisions of future generations
do not affect the payoffs of the current generation, so that dynamic considerations do not change the
strategic tradeoffs faced by the players.
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If communication outside the immediate family is impossible, the family equilibrium is
the only equilibrium. The family equilibrium can also occur as a “bad” equilibrium in an
economy where more communication links are available, but people fail to coordinate
on a more efficient punishment equilibrium.21
Now consider the balanced growth path under the family equilibrium. We assume that
the Malthusian feedback, parameterized by the maximum number of children n¯ and the
survival parameter s, is sufficiently strong for dynamics to lead to a balanced growth
path in which income per capita is constant.22 The following proposition summarizes
the properties of the balanced growth path.
Proposition 2 (Balanced Growth Path in Family Equilibrium).
If altruism is sufficiently strong (i.e., γ is sufficiently large), there exists a unique balanced
growth path under the family equilibrium with the following properties:
(a) Each child trains only with his own parent: mF = 1, and aF = nF.
(b) The growth factor gF of knowledge k is:
gF = 1+ ν.
(c) The growth factor nF of population N is:
nF = (1+ ν)
(1−α)θ
α .







Proof. See Appendix C. 
The condition for sufficient altruism reflects that parental altruism should be strong
enough to overcome the disutility of teaching one’s children. The rate of technologi-
cal progress is positive in the family equilibrium, but small. This is because the only
source of progress is the new ideas of craftsmen (recall that ν measures the quality of
21For any communication structure, the family equilibrium always exists, because in the expectation
that no one else will punish shirking masters it is optimal to (i) never punish shirking masters either and
(ii) not send one’s own children to be apprenticed outside the family.
22The required assumptions can be made precise; what is key is that maximum population growth is
larger than the maximum rate of effective productivity growth.
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new ideas). New ideas are passed on to children, which makes children, on average,
more productive than the parents. However, knowledge does not disseminate across
dynasties. Given the growth rate of knowledge gF = 1+ ν, Malthusian dynamics ensure












Figure 1: Productivity and Population Growth in the Family (F) Equilibrium
Figure 1 represents the determination of the balanced growth path in the family equi-
librium. The concave curve represents the Malthusian constraint given by (10).23 The
intersection between this constraint and the line g = 1 + ν gives the balanced growth
path under the family equilibrium F.
4.3 The Clan
Next, we consider economies where there is communication within an extended family
or clan. While many other structures could be considered, the clan has particular histori-
cal significance because of its importance for organizing economic exchange in the major
world regions outside Europe. Formally, we consider a setting where all members of a
dynasty who share an ancestor o generations back can communicate (here o = 0 corre-
sponds to the family equilibrium, o = 1 means siblings are connected, and so on). Now
consider a potential “clan equilibrium” with the following equilibrium strategy profiles:
23The curve is concave if θ(1− α) < α, but results to do not depend on this condition.
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• All craftsmen send their children to be trained by each master in the clan, and
parents compensate masters for the apprenticeship by paying each δ′(a)− κ (the
marginal cost), where a is the number of apprentices per master.
• All masters put effort into teaching.
• If (off the equilibrium path) a master cheats an apprentice, all current members of
the clan punish the master.
For example, if o = 1, children are trained not only by their parents, but also by their
aunts and uncles. For o = 2, second-degree relatives serve as masters, and so on.24
Along a balanced growth path, the total number of adults (i.e., masters) belonging to
the clan is (nC)o, where nC is the rate of population growth in the balanced growth path.
For learning from all current masters to be feasible, we assume that all members of the
clan work in the same trade. An alternative setup allows for large clans that engage
in many trades, in which case a child would be trained only by those masters in the
clan who work in the child’s chosen trade. In either case, we envision that in the clan
equilibrium children obtain the knowledge of a handful of masters who belong to the
same clan and to the same trade.
The following proposition summarizes the properties of the balanced growth path in
the clan equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (Balanced Growth Path in Clan Equilibrium).
There is threshold omax > 0 such that if o < omax and if altruism is sufficiently strong (i.e., γ is
sufficiently large), there exists a balanced growth path in the clan equilibrium with the following
properties:
(a) The number of masters per child m is given by the number of adults in the clan, mC =
(nC)o, and the number of apprentices per master is aC = (nC)o+1.
(b) The growth factor gCk of knowledge k is the solution to:
gC = 1+
ν (nC)o
gC − ν . (15)
24In reality, it may not be necessary to receive full training from all clan members. Instead, one could
assume that apprentices initially search over the entire group, sample the masters’ knowledge, but then
spend most of their time learning from the clan member identified to have the lowest h. We adopt the
simpler notion of learning equally from all masters to preserve the symmetry that makes the problem
tractable.
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For o = 0, the balanced growth path coincides with the family equilibrium, whereas for o > 0
knowledge growth, population growth, and income per capita are higher compared to the family
equilibrium. The growth gC of knowledge k is increasing in the size of the clan o.
Proof. See Appendix D. 
Parallel to the family equilibrium, the condition on sufficiently high altruism ensures
that parents find it worthwhile to pay for the training of their children.25 The up-
per bound omax on the size of the clan limits productivity growth to a level where the
Malthusian feedback is sufficiently strong to generate a balanced growth path with con-
stant income per capita.
The clan equilibrium leads to a higher growth rate compared to the family equilibrium
because children learn from more masters. In particular, they benefit not just from the
new ideas of their own parent, but also from the new ideas of their aunts, uncles, and
other current members of the clan. Thus, new knowledge disseminates more widely
compared to the family equilibrium. However, there is still no dissemination of knowl-
edge across clans. Equation (15) implies that as long as ν > 0 (there is some innovation),
a higher o (larger clans) leads to faster growth. However, if there are no new ideas,
ν = 0, the growth rate in the clan equilibrium is zero. Intuitively, in a clan the masters
of a given apprentice all trained with the same masters when they were apprentices,
which implies that they all started out with the same knowledge. If the masters don’t
25Another possibility is that altruism is at a level sufficient for parents to want to send their children
to some, but not all, available masters. Characterizing the balanced growth path in this case is more
complicated, because the selection of which masters to train with is non-trivial. Nevertheless, the basic
shortcoming of the clan-based institution, namely that different masters have similar knowledge and so
less new knowledge can be gained by getting trained by more of them, would still apply in this type of
equilibrium.
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have new ideas of their own, studying with multiple masters does not provide any ben-
efit over studying with only one of them. Hence, knowledge does not accumulate across
generations.
Another way of stating this key point is that learning opportunities in the clan are lim-
ited, because the knowledge of the available masters is correlated. This correlation, in
turn, arises from the fact that the available masters once learned from the same teachers,
and hence acquired the same pooled knowledge present within the clan. As we will see,
this issue of correlated knowledge across masters is the key distinction between the clan















Figure 2: Productivity and Population Growth in the Clan (C) Equilibrium
Figure 2 represents the determination of the balanced growth path in the clan equilib-








which is derived from (15). This function is equal to one when g = 1 + ν, increases
monotonically with g for g > 1 + ν, and ultimately crosses the Malthusian constraint.
The function (16) captures the relationship between population growth and the size of
the clan. When n = 1, every person has one child, and hence there are no siblings and
no aunts or uncles. Therefore, children can learn only from their own parent, who is the
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sole adult member of the clan. At higher rates of population growth, the clan is bigger,
and hence there are more masters who generate ideas and whom the young can learn
from, resulting in faster technological progress.
4.4 The Market
At the opposite extreme (compared to the family) of enforcement institutions, we now
consider outcomes in an economy with formal contract enforcement (as in the usual
complete-markets model). All contracts are perfectly and costlessly enforced, so that
masters who promise to train apprentices do not shirk. There is a competitive market
for apprenticeship. Given market price p for training apprentices, masters decide how
many apprentices to train, and parents decide how many masters to pay to train their
children. In equilibrium, p adjusts to clear the apprenticeship market.
A craftsman’s decision to take on apprentices is a straightforward profit maximization




{p a + κ a− δ(a)} .
The benefit of taking on apprentices derives from the price p as well as the apprentices’
production κ, and the cost is given by δ(a). Optimization implies that in equilibrium the
price of apprenticeship equals the marginal cost of training an apprentice:
p = δ′(a)− κ.
Now consider parents’ choice of the number of masters m that their children should
learn from. Given p, parents will choose m to maximize their utility (1):
max
m
{−p m n + γE I′} ,
where n is the number of children and I′ is the income of the child, which is given
by (5). Each child’s expected income depends on m, because learning from a larger
number of masters increases the expected productivity (and hence income) of the child.
The objective function is concave, because as m rises, the probability that an additional
master will have higher productivity declines.
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Lemma 1. The first-order condition for the parent’s problem implies:





Proof. See Appendix E. 
Notice that the decision problem implicitly assumes that the young apprentice gets m
independent draws from the distribution of knowledge among the elders, as though
the masters were drawn at random. The possibility of independent draws from the
knowledge distribution is a key advantage of the market system over the clan system.
In a clan, the potential masters have similar knowledge (because they learned from the
same “grand” master), and hence the gain from studying with more of them is limited
(there is still some gain because of the new ideas generated by masters). Of course, it
would be even better to study only with masters known to have superior knowledge.
We assume, however, that a master’s knowledge can be assessed only by studying with
them; hence, choosing masters at random is the best one can do.
The market equilibrium gives rise to a unique balanced growth path, which is charac-
terized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Balanced Growth Path in Market Equilibrium).
The unique balanced growth path in the market equilibrium has the following properties:
(a) The number of apprentices per master aM solves (17):
δ′(aM)− κ = γ θ(1− α) 1
aM/nM + ν
yM, (18)
and the number of masters per child mM is the solution to mM = aM/nM.
(b) The growth factor gM of knowledge k is given by:
gM = mM + ν.












The market equilibrium yields higher growth in productivity and population and higher income
per capita than does the clan equilibrium and the family equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix F. 
To analyze the equilibrium, we can plug the expressions for aM, mM, and yM into (17) to
get:





This equation describes a relationship between gM and nM which we call the “appren-
ticeship market,” as it is derived from demand for apprenticeship and the equilibrium
condition on the apprenticeship market. Equation (19) can be rewritten as:
nM =
κ
δ¯(gM − ν)− γθ(1− α)
n¯ s gM
(20)
This function of gM is plotted in Figure 3. The negative relationship between population
growth and the rate of technical progress in (19) can be interpreted as follows. When
fertility is higher, the market for apprenticeships is tighter, the equilibrium price of ap-
prenticeship is higher, and parents demand fewer masters. Hence faster population
growth is associated with lower productivity growth.
The market equilibrium leads to faster growth than the clan equilibrium does because
knowledge is disseminated across ancestral boundaries throughout the entire economy.
The masters teaching apprentices represent a wider range of knowledge, implying that
more can be learned from them.26 All of this is made possible by having a different
enforcement technology for apprenticeship contracts, namely courts rather than pun-
ishment by clan members.
26The contrast between clan and market equilibrium is an example of social structure being important
for economic outcomes; a similar application to technology diffusion is provided in the recent work by





















Figure 3: Productivity and Population Growth in the Market (M) Equilibrium
4.5 The Guild
Historically, economies did not transition directly from the family or clan equilibrium to
the market equilibrium; rather, there were intermediate stages of semi-formal enforce-
ment through institutions other than the state. In Europe, the key intermediate institu-
tion was the guild system, which for centuries regulated apprenticeship and knowledge
transmission, at a time when state power was still weak. We now provide a formal
characterization of a “guild equilibrium” as an intermediate step between the family
equilibrium and the market equilibrium.
We envision a guild as an association of all masters involved in the same trade. In the
production function (3), the effective labor supply from many different trades is com-
bined with limited substitutability across trades, so that market power can arise. Allow-
ing for heterogeneous labor supply by different trades, the labor income of a craftsman
i in trade j is:







Apprentices choose the most attractive trade. In equilibrium, the net benefit of joining
as an apprentice is equalized across trades, so that for all j we have:
E I′ij − pjmj = E q′ij (1− α)
Y′
L′
− p m. (21)
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Collusion among masters in a given guild leads to social costs and benefits compared
to the clan equilibrium. The costs are the usual downsides from limited competition;
the guild has an incentive to raise prices and limit entry. Guilds enforced labor market
monopsonies, and as a result often limited the number of apprentices that each master
was allowed to take on at one time, specified the number of years each apprentice had
to spend with his master, or even stipulated time periods that had to elapse between
taking on one apprentice and the next (Trivellato 2008, p. 212; Kaplan 1981, p. 283).
The purpose of these constraints was to limit supply and increase exclusionary rents,
which for our analysis means that technological progress is slowed down compared to
a market equilibrium.27 However, guilds operated across different dynasties and thus
represented the full range of knowledge in the given trade. If the guild also enforced
apprenticeship contracts (in the same fashion as in the clan equilibrium above), there
was more scope for knowledge accumulation. Thus, in the absence of strong centralized
contract enforcement institutions (i.e., if the clan and not the market was the relevant
alternative), the guild had a genuinely positive role to play.28
Consider the choice of a guild j of setting the price of apprenticeship pj within the trade,
or equivalently, of choosing the number aj of apprentices per master. The guild maxi-
mizes the utility of the masters in the trade. If the guild lowers aj, the effective supply
of craftsmen’s labor in trade j in the next generation goes down. Due to limited substi-
tutability across trades, this increases future craftsmen’s income in the trade, and thus
the price pj that today’s apprentices are willing to pay. Thus, as in a standard monop-
olistic problem, the guild will raise pj to a level above the marginal cost of training




pj aj − δ(aj) + κ aj
}
(22)
27We focus on the role of guilds in limiting entry because this is what matters for growth in our setting.
Another anti-competitive role of guilds is to limit competition in product markets (Ogilvie 2014, 2016). In
our model, this feature does not arise because we abstract from an intensive margin of labor supply.
28This feature provides a contrast between our work and other recent research on the economic role of
guilds, such as Desmet and Parente (2014).
29For simplicity, and realistically for the European case, we assume that the children of masters in trade













Here Sj is the endogenous relative share of apprentices choosing to join trade j. We have
Sj = 1 in equilibrium; however, the guild solves its maximization problem taking the
behavior of all other trades as given, so that Sj varies with pj and aj in the maximization
problem of the guild. The second constraint represents the optimal behavior of parents
sending their children to trade j (equalizing pj to the marginal benefit of training with an
additional master). The third constraint stems from the mobility of apprentices across
trades (from (21)). These two equations represent the two market forces limiting the
power of the guild. Notice that Y′/N′ is exogenous for the guild j, because each trade is
of infinitesimal size.
Lemma 2. At the symmetric equilibrium, the solution to the maximization problem (22) satis-
fies:





with Ω(m) < 1.
Proof. See Appendix G. 
Thus, the condition determining equilibrium in the apprenticeship market is of the same
form as in the market equilibrium (see Lemma 1), but with the benefit from apprentice-
ship scaled down by a factor strictly smaller than one. Hence, the extent of apprentice-
ship (and productivity growth) will be lower compared to the market equilibrium. In
the limit where trades become perfect substitutes, λ → 1, we have that Ω(m) → 1, i.e.,
guilds have no market power and the problem of the guild leads to the same solution as
the market (Lemma 1).
We can now characterize the balanced growth path in the guild equilibrium.
Proposition 5 (Balanced Growth Path in Guild Equilibrium).
The unique balanced growth path in the guild equilibrium has the following properties:
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(a) The number of apprentices per master aG solves (23):








and the number of masters per child mG is the solution to mG = aG/nG.
(b) The growth factor gG of knowledge k is given by:
gG = mG + ν.











The guild equilibrium yields lower growth in productivity and population and lower income per
capita than does the market equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix H. 
The guild equilibrium is represented in Figure 4, where the apprenticeship market is
described by Equation (24). This relationship is similar to the apprenticeship market
condition in the market equilibrium, but with a shift to the left because of the market
power of the guild, represented by the term Ω(·).
For explaining the rise of European technological supremacy, the key comparison is
between the growth performance of the guild equilibrium (which we view as represent-
ing Europe for much of the period from the Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution)
and the clan equilibrium (a feature of other regions such as China, India, and the Mid-
dle East). There are forces in both directions; guilds foster growth compared to clans
because knowledge can disseminate across ancestral lines, but at the same time the an-
ticompetitive behavior of guilds may limit access to apprenticeship. For this reason, the
ranking of growth rates depends on parameters. The guild will lead to faster growth if















Figure 4: Productivity and Population Growth in the Guild (G) Equilibrium
power, so that the guild equilibrium is close to the market equilibrium. Moreover, the
guild also generates faster growth if the rate of innovation ν (i.e., the relative efficiency
of new versus existing ideas) is close to zero. In this case, most growth is due to the
dissemination of existing ideas rather than to the generation of new knowledge, and
guilds dominate clans in terms of dissemination (recall that the growth rate in the clan
equilibrium is zero if ν = 0).
Perhaps the most important comparison is that the guild would always lead to more
growth than the clan if the number of masters m were the same in both systems. In the
guild, conditional on m, masters are selected in the best possible way (namely as inde-
pendent draws from the distribution of knowledge, which maximizes the probability
that something new can be learned from an additional master). While the guild may
limit access to apprenticeship, it does benefit from allowing for an efficient choice of
masters, because this raises the expected benefit of learning from masters and hence the
price apprentices are willing to pay. Put differently, the guild distorts only the quantity,
but not the quality of apprenticeship. In contrast, in the clan the knowledge of the mul-
tiple masters that a given apprentice learns from is necessarily correlated, given that all
masters started out with the same initial knowledge available in the clan. Thus, for a
given m, in a clan apprentices are exposed to a smaller variety of ideas, and (on average)
they learn less. Hence, the only scenario where the clan could generate more growth
than the guild is where the market power of guilds is so strong that they would re-
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duce m to well below the level prevalent in the clan. If anything, the historical evidence
points in the opposite direction. Through the multiple interactions that apprenticeship
and journeymanship provided, the European guild system is likely to have offered at
least as many learning opportunities as the contemporary clan based system did. From
the perspective of our model, faster technological progress in Western Europe compared
to other world regions would then be the necessary consequence.
4.6 Apprenticeship Institutions and Growth in a Parameterized Economy
We now illustrate our results with a parameterized example of the model economy. We
do not formally calibrate the model, but choose parameter values that yield broadly
plausible growth rates for the historical period considered. One period (generation)
is interpreted as 25 years. We first set α = 0.8, θ = 0.25, γ = 0.1, n¯ = 2, s = 7.5,
o = 3, κ = 0.02, and λ = 4. We then set ν (the relative efficiency of new ideas) so as
to reproduce a growth rate of population of 0.86 percent per generation in the family
equilibrium, which matches the estimated growth of population between 10000 BCE
and 1000 CE in Clark (2007), Table 7.1. This yields ν ≈ 0.15. We set the cost of training
apprentices such that the number of masters per apprentice m is identical in the clan
and guild equilibria, which yields δ¯ ≈ 0.019. It would be more realistic to allow for
a higher m in the guild equilibrium, but equalizing m across the institutional regimes
allows us to isolate the additional growth in the guild equilibrium, compared to the clan
equilibrium, that arises solely out of the increased variety in masters’ knowledge. Any
growth effects due to a higher m in the guild would be additional to this effect.
g− 1 n− 1 m y
Family Equilibrium (F) 14.7% 0.86% 1 6.724
Clan Equilibrium (C) 14.9% 0.87% 1.018 6.725
Guild Equilibrium (G) 16.4% 0.96% 1.018 6.730
Market Equilibrium (M) 17.7% 1.02% 1.030 6.735
Table 1: Balanced Growth Paths for Different Apprenticeship Institutions in Parame-
terized Economy (g − 1 is productivity growth; n − 1 is population growth, and also
growth in total output; m is the number of masters each apprentice learns from; y is
income per capita)
Table 1 displays the balanced growth rates for knowledge k and population N under
each apprenticeship institution, together with the number of masters per apprentice m
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and income per adult y. Notice that since y is constant in the balanced growth path, the
growth rate of total output Y is equal to the growth rate of population N. We find that
productivity growth, population growth, output growth, and income per capita are all
increasing as we proceed from family to clan, guild, and ultimately the market. Unlike
in Malthusian theories with fixed productivity growth, in our model the long-run level
of income per capita is endogenous and depends on learning institutions.
In terms of the growth performance of the different institutional regimes, we notice that
the growth advantage of the clan compared to the family is small. In contrast, guild and
market yield substantially higher growth rates than either family or clan. The market
yields the highest growth rate. However, moving from clan to guild already generates
60 percent of the growth rate differential between clan and market, despite the fact that
(by our choice of parameterization) the number of apprentices is identical in the clan
and guild equilibria.30 Hence, the easier dissemination of knowledge for a given m in
a system unconstrained by bloodlines accounts for the majority of the overall growth
effect of better institutions. Moving from guild to market yields an additional growth
effect through a higher m (because in the market system, guilds are not able to restrict
access to apprenticeship). The variation in m between the apprenticeship institutions
is small in our example (from 1 in the family to 1.03 in the market). If we lowered the
cost of training apprentices to generate higher (and arguably more realistic) values for m
under the guild and market institutions, the differences in growth rates across regimes
would be even larger.31
5 The Rise of Europe’s Technological Primacy
A central question about pre-industrial economic growth is how, in the centuries leading
up to the Industrial Revolution, Western Europe pulled ahead of other world regions. It
came to achieve technological primacy over the previous leaders, and on the eve of the
30Notice that in all cases, the number of masters per apprentice m is either equal to one or close to one.
While we treat m in the model as a continuous variable, an alternative interpretation is that even in the
more efficient instititional regimes, relatively few workers benefit from learning from multiple masters,
generating a low average m in the aggregate.
31Greif and Tabellini (2015) discuss the dynamic implications of a somewhat similar issue. In their pa-
per, different equilibria are determined by how people choose their location on the basis of their types (or
moral beliefs), which are either “clannish” or “general.” Like skills, moral beliefs are transmitted between
generations, but rather than being taught on a one-to-one basis, beliefs result from vertical socialization
and the environment in a cultural evolution model. Moral beliefs in their paper are measured by a will-
ingness to contribute to public goods, whereas we are interested in the quality of productive skills. In our
model we do not rely on heterogeneous preferences and what is driving the different equilibria are the
different institutions the economy relies on to enforce the master-apprentice contract.
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Industrial Revolution living standards had become substantially higher than elsewhere.
A number of researchers have cited the region’s faster growth as a key precondition for
successful industrialization.32
As our analysis above makes clear, in our view apprenticeship institutions that pro-
moted the dissemination of knowledge lay at the heart of Western Europe’s success.
Many of the guild arrangements supported the spread of technological knowledge be-
yond the boundaries of individual guilds, a critical factor in the diffusion of technology
across the European continent.33 Beyond the practice of tramping during the Wander-
jahre, guilds also supplied waystations or Herbergen to host itinerant journeymen, who
sometimes were lodged at the expense of the guild. Local artisans would interview these
artisans, and sometimes hire them (Farr 2000, p. 212). Trained artisans were a mobile
element in Europe. Some were highly mobile journeymen who moved across linguis-
tic and national boundaries; others were permanent immigrants, lured by incentives or
immigrants to new settlements. Technology diffused through Europe with skilled crafts-
men in search of a livelihood. Given the localized nature of control guilds wielded, there
seems to be no serious way they could have prevented this diffusion from happening
(Reith 2008).
What remains to be determined is why Europe adopted superior institutions such as
the guild and ultimately the market, whereas other regions failed to do so. We now con-
sider mechanisms that explain transitions over time between different apprenticeship
institutions.
In our view, the adoption of superior institutions in Europe is rooted in differences in
initial conditions. As we mentioned earlier, most of the non-European pre-industrial
economies were characterized by the clan equilibrium. The importance of clans in China
has recently been emphasized in the work of Avner Greif with different coauthors (e.g.,
Greif and Tabellini 2010, Greif, Iyigun, and Sasson 2012, and Greif and Iyigun 2013).
More generally, Kumar and Matsusaka (2009) report an array of historical evidence doc-
umenting the preindustrial importance of kinship networks in China, India, and the
Islamic world. In contrast to the rest of the world, in Europe the nuclear family came
to dominate (corresponding to the family equilibrium in our model). It is clear that by
32The rise of Europe in the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution is also the subject of two
recent papers by Voigtla¨nder and Voth (2013a, 2013b). However, they emphasize demographic changes,
whereas our analysis is about differences in productivity growth.
33Our theoretical analysis implicitly allows for such wide diffusion by assuming that guilds comprise
all masters in a given trade, rather than being limited to specific cities or regions.
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1500, extended families (or what we might call “clans”) had become less visible in Eu-
rope, and especially in the Western part (Shorter 1975, p. 284). Peter Laslett, who has
done more than anyone to establish this view, referred to the typical European family
as the conjugal family unit, couple plus offspring (Laslett and Wall 1972). When, and
even more so why, this pattern became so dominant in Europe remains to this day a
debated question.34 To some extent it may have been encouraged by policies of the
Western Christian church, as Greif and Tabellini argue. In Europe the Christian church
actively discouraged practices that sustained kinship groups. The existence of institu-
tions that encouraged the cooperation among non-kin, such as manors and monasteries,
may have been equally important. By the early Middle Ages the nuclear family already
dominated in some areas.35
Why did (nuclear) family-based Europe adopt better institutions over time, while clan-
based regions did not? One potential explanation is that it is precisely Europe’s starting
point in the low-growth family equilibrium that fostered the more rapid adoption of
superior institutions. If adopting the guild or market systems is costly, the incentive for
adoption depends on the the performance of the existing institutions. In our view, other
world regions had less to gain from adopting new institutions, given that the clan-based
system performed well for most purposes.
To formalize this possibility, consider the option of adopting the guild system at fixed
per-family cost of µ(N). We let this cost depend on the density of population, with
µ′(N) < 0 reflecting the idea that the adoption of guilds is cheaper when density is
high (in line with the fact that the incidence of guilds increases with population density,
see De Munck, Lourens, and Lucassen 2006). This cost µ(N) can either be seen either
as an aggregate cost of setting up guilds or courts, or linked to an individual decision,
i.e., the cost of moving from a small town to a larger city where contract enforcement
institutions are in place.
Formally, we need to compare the utility of the parents from keeping the current system,
uF→F and uC→C with the one of adopting the guild based apprenticeship, uF→G and uC→G.
Let us consider two economies having the same population N0 and knowledge k0, one
34The dominance of the nuclear family went together with the enforcement of strict monogamy, when
it became infeasible for men to simultaneously father children from multiple women, and remarriage was
only possible after widowhood, see de la Croix and Mariani (2015).
35Mitterauer (2010) describes two signs of the emergence of the nuclear family: the distinction between
paternal and maternal relatives disappeared from the Romance languages by 600 CE (and from other
European languages soon after); and spiritual kinships analogous to blood kinships were established
(such as godmother and godfather).
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in the family system, the other in the clan system. The distribution of income is thus
the same in these two economies, as is mean income y0 and the number of children
n0. Adults have to decide whether to pay the cost µ to adopt the guild. If the guild is
adopted, the equilibrium price of apprenticeship will be p0, the number of apprentices
per master will be a0, and the number of masters teaching one apprentice will be m0.
The income of the children under the guild system will be given by: yF→G = yC→G ≡ yG1 .
Let us now write the utility in the four cases:
uF→F = y0 + γ n0 yF1 + κ n0 − δ(n0)
uF→G = y0 + γ n0 yG1 + κ a0 − δ(a0)− µ(N0)
uC→C = y0 + γ n0 yC1 + κ (n0)
o+1 − δ((n0)o+1)
uC→G = y0 + γ n0 yG1 + κ a0 − δ(a0)− µ(N0)
The following propositions gives the main result.
Proposition 6 (Transition from Family and Clan to Guild).
Consider two economies with the same initial knowledge and population, one in the family equi-
librium, and one in the clan equilibrium. If limN→0 µ(N) = ∞ and limN→∞ µ(N) = 0, there
exist population thresholds N and N, with N < N, such that:
. if N0 < N, none of the economies adopt the guild institution.
. if N ≤ N0 ≤ N, only the economy in the family equilibrium adopts the guild institution.
. if N < N0, both economies adopt the guild institution.
Proof. See Appendix I. 
Given equal populations, the incentive to pay the fixed cost will be lower when the
initial economic system is more successful, i.e., a clan-based economy will be less likely
to adopt than a family-based economy.36
Take now two hypothetical economies starting with the same low level of population.
Suppose that one of them starts in the family equilibrium, whereas in the other the clan
equilibrium prevails. In both economies, population is low and the guild equilibrium
is not adopted, but there is still some technical progress and population grows. Given
36This explanation applies earlier work by Avner Greif (see in particular Greif 1993 and Greif 1994) on
institutional change to the issue of human capital and knowledge transmission.
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Proposition 3, population growth is higher in the clan economy. The question is which
economy will first reach the population threshold that makes adopting the market op-
timal. The family economy has a lower threshold value, but, as it grows more slowly,
it is not clear that it will adopt the guild first. A possible trajectory is the one shown in
Figure 5. Here, the family economy adopts the guild earlier, at date t1, which allows it
to catch up and overtake the C economy. Later on, the clan economy may or may not
reach its own threshold above which it is optimal to adopt the guild, depending on the
properties of the cost function µ(·), and in particular how it behaves when population
becomes large. If limN→∞ µ(N) = 0, the guild will be adopted for sure (which is the
case covered in Proposition 6). But if limN→∞ µ(N) > 0 (which is the case, for instance,
if the total cost of setting up guilds includes a fixed cost per family), the economy may
stay permanently in the clan equilibrium. The case displayed in the picture is where the
economy that starts out in the clan equilibrium reaches the threshold at some later date
t2.




µ(N) > γnC(yG1 − yC) + κ(aG1 − (nC)o+1)− δ(aG1) + δ((nC)o+1),
the economy in the clan equilibrium never adopts the guild.
Here the values of nC and yC are defined in Proposition 3, and yG1 , a
G
1 are values from the
guild equilibrium after one period, starting from the clan balanced growth path as the
initial condition. The proposition holds because, in a Malthusian context, income per
person yC and yG1 remains bounded.
In reality, complementary mechanisms are likely to have also contributed to the fail-
ure of clan-based economies to adopt more efficient apprenticeship institutions. The
clan-based organization had many advantages over the family other than faster knowl-
edge growth; indeed, most economic and social life was organized around the clan.
One specific aspect was that the clan adhered to what Greif and Tabellini call “limited
morality”—a loyalty to kin but not to others. Such institutions have obvious attractions,
such as an advantage in intra-group cooperation, the supply of public goods, and mu-
tual insurance. But they have a comparative disadvantage in sustaining broader inter-
group cooperation. In terms of economic efficiency, the two arrangements of family and
clan therefore have clear tradeoffs. The clan economizes on enforcement costs, but at
























Figure 5: Possible Dynamics of Two Economies Starting from the Same N0
clan-based economy, the cost of giving up the existing system of social organization (in
favor of the guild system) is likely to have been much higher than what our stylized
model suggests.
Another dimension is that the dominance of the nuclear family in Europe created a need
early on for organizations that cut across family lines. Guilds were independent of fami-
lies, but they had many antecedents that had a similar legal status (such as monasteries,
universities or independent cities). Hence, earlier institutional developments may have
made the adoption of guilds in Europe much cheaper compared to clan-based societies.
Still other factors also may have been at work in specific regions. A striking difference
between China and Europe before the Industrial Revolution is in settlement patterns.
China was, as Greif and Tabellini point out, a land of clans, but much less than Europe a
land of cities. As Rosenthal and Wong (2011, p. 113) stress, Chinese manufacturing was
much less concentrated in cities than it was in Europe—a difference they attribute to the
dissimilar warfare patterns. In China the main threat came not from one’s neighbors
but from invading nomads from the steppe; hence the need for a Great Wall. Cities were
walled to some extent, but walled cities were far fewer than in Europe, and the walls
served more as symbols than as protection from attack. As much as 97 percent of the
Chinese population lived outside the walled cities. This difference in urbanization is
an important clue to why European institutions evolved in a different way. If the cost
of adopting guilds depends on population density, the “effective” population density
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would have been much higher in Europe, because craftsmen were concentrated in small
urban areas. In the model above, that difference would be represented as a lower level
of the cost function µ(N) for a given overall population.
In our analysis of institutional transitions, we focus on the introduction of apprentice-
ships and guilds in Western Europe. An important topic for future research is to con-
sider also the ensuing transition from guild to market, which results in even more rapid
growth. If we are comparing Europe with the world of clans, we must note that all-
powerful guilds were not ubiquitous in Europe, and that by the middle of the seven-
teenth century craft guilds were declining in many areas. In the Netherlands, in Eng-
land, and even to some extent in France, the power of guilds to impose restrictions on
entry and to control product markets faded in the eighteenth century. It was then that
“free trade” regions (i.e., exempted from guild control) emerged, such as the famous one
in the Faubourg St. Antoine near Paris (Horn 2015, pp. 1–3). In other words, not only
did Europe adopt guilds, a superior set of institutions for transmitting skills relative to
clans, but also, Europe was in transit to a market system which was even better at it.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined sources of productivity growth in pre-industrial soci-
eties, in order to explain the economic ascendency of Western Europe in the centuries
leading up to industrialization. We developed a model of person-to-person exchanges
of ideas, and argued that apprenticeship institutions that regulate the transmission of
tacit knowledge between generations are key for understanding the performance of pre-
industrial economies.
In our analysis, we have put the spotlight on differences across institutions in the dis-
semination of knowledge. Of course, a second channel of productivity growth is inno-
vation, i.e., the creation of entirely new knowledge. Our analysis does allow for inno-
vation in the form of new ideas, but we have held this aspect of productivity growth
constant across institutions. A natural extension of our work would be to examine how
the institutional differences we identify here as driving differences in the dissemination
of knowledge may affect incentives for original innovation. The importance of highly
skilled craftsmen for the innovative activities that led to the Industrial Revolution has
become an important theme in the industrialization literature. Indeed, some scholars
such as Hilaire-Pe´rez (2007) and Epstein (2013) have argued that rising artisanal skill lev-
els and the high level of innovation among the most sophisticated craftsmen alone could
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have fostered the Industrial Revolution. While such an extreme view slights the contri-
bution of codifiable knowledge and formal science, there is no question that high-ability
artisans were a pivotal element in the rise of modern technology, and that Britain’s lead-
ership rested to a great extent on the advantage it had in skilled workers (Kelly, Mokyr,
and O´ Gra´da 2014). It is more realistic to argue that there were strong complementari-
ties between the growth of modern science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
and the existence of highly refined skills. Advances were made by a literate and edu-
cated elite, the classic example of upper-tail human capital (de la Croix and Licandro
2015, and Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder 2015). Increasing longevity, moreover, in the
mid-seventeenth century may have stimulated further investment in the human capital
of this elite and facilitated the diffusion of their knowledge. Yet, just as importantly,
these highly educated people interacted with the most skilled and dexterous craftsmen
(Meisenzahl and Mokyr 2012).
A powerful example of this complementarity is the British watch industry in the eigh-
teenth century. Watchmaking was a high-level skill, originally regulated by a guild (the
Worshipful Company of Clockmakers, one of the original livery companies of the City
of London) but by 1700 more or less free of guild restrictions. Training occurred ex-
clusively through master-apprentice relations. In the seventeenth century, the industry
experienced a major technological shock by the invention of the spiral-spring balance in
watches by two of the best minds of the seventeenth century, Christiaan Huygens and
Robert Hooke (ca. 1675). No similar macro-invention occurred over the subsequent cen-
tury, yet the real price of watches fell by an average of 1.3 percent a year between 1685
and 1810 (Kelly and O´ Gra´da 2016). As Kelly and O´ Gra´da note, “Once this conceptual
breakthrough occurred, England’s extensive tradition of metal working and the relative
absence of restrictions on hiring apprentices, along with an extensive market of affluent
consumers, allowed its watch industry to expand rapidly”(p. 5). An eighteenth century
observer noted that for watchmaking an apprentice needed at least 14 years (or fewer
if he was “tolerably acute”) and that to be truly skilled he needed to learn a “smatter-
ing of mechanics and mathematics”—presumably skills that were taught by the master
(Campbell 1747, p. 252). We leave for future research an exploration of the various com-
plementarities between the dissemination of the creation of knowledge within a model
of person-to-person exchanges of ideas.
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Online Appendices
A Extension with Farmers
In this section, we sketch how the model can be extended by including farm labor as
a separate input in production. This extension addresses the concern that in the pre-
industrial era, most people were engaged in food production, whereas craftspeople
made up a smaller fraction of the population.
The single consumption good (which we interpret as a composite of food and manu-
factured goods) is produced with a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant






with α, β ∈ (0, 1). The total amount of land is normalized to one, X = 1, and land is
owned by farmers.
The aggregate state variables are now three: N f (population of farmers), Nm (population
of craftsmen), and k. Let N = Nm + N f be the total number of adults. Farmers and
craftsmen have the same survival rate and there is no intergenerational mobility across
occupations. Hence, the laws of motion for population are:
N′m = n Nm, N′f = n N f , N
′ = N′m + N′f = n N.






The assumptions of equal population growth and no occupational mobility are made for
simplicity. In reality, it is well known that in pre-industrial times cities (where craftsmen
were concentrated) experienced much higher mortality than the countryside, so that
there was net migration into cities. Allowing for such rural-urban migration could be
accommodated in our framework and would leave the main results intact, but would
come at the cost of complicating the analysis. Given that our focus is on knowledge
transmission rather than urbanization, we abstract from such features here.
Given those two changes to the specification, the rest of analysis carries on. Two new
parameters are involved. The market equilibrium condition (18) becomes:





It becomes easier to analyze the role of parameter α, as now, this one only plays a role
in the Malthusian constraint. A low α corresponds to labor-intensive agriculture. In
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this case returns to population size decrease at a lower rate, and hence an increase in
productivity growth leads to a larger shift in population growth and income per capita
compared to the case of a large land share.37 It modifies the incentives to move to an-













Figure 6: Effect of labor intensive agriculture
Proposition 8 (Effect of Labor-Intensive Agriculture).
If Agriculture is labor intensive (low α), the long-term gains in growth from moving from family
to market, gM − gF, and from clan to market, gM − gC, are reduced. But the gain from moving
from family to clan, gC − gF, is increased.
Figure 6 shows the result graphically. An implication of this proposition is that a country
with labor intensive agriculture has more incentives to adopt the clan than the family.
B Extension with the “Leonardo da Vinci” Assumption
In this section, we allow for the possibility that advanced techniques may be “ahead of
their time,” in the sense that their full productive value can only be realized at a higher
state of aggregate knowledge. For example, Leonardo da Vinci invented a number of
machines and devices that could be successfully built only centuries later. To capture
this feature in a simple way, we assume that each craftsman has a potential output which
is linked to own knowledge hi, but that the craftsman may be constrained by the average
37Vollrath (2011) argues that agriculture in pre-industrial China was more labor intensive compared
to Europe (due to the possibility of multiple crops per year, wet-field rice production etc.), and that this
accounts for part of observed differences in living standards.
59
state of knowledge in the economy. Specifically, the potential output q¯i of a craftsman
with knowledge hi is given by:
q¯i = h−θi . (25)
The actual output qi of a craftsman cannot exceed the average potential output q¯ =
E (q¯i) in the economy, so that:
qi = min{q¯i, q¯}. (26)
The assumption that individual productivity is constrained by aggregate knowledge is
not essential to any of our results. Still, without this assumption in any period there
would be some masters with arbitrarily high output, which is implausible. With the
constraint, a good part of the knowledge in the economy is latent knowledge that will
unfold its full potential only in later generations. This closely relates to Mokyr (2002)’s
argument that the growth of productivity is constrained by the epistemic base on which
a technique rests. The more people using a technique understand the science behind
it, the broader the base. According to Mokyr (2002), this basis was very narrow in pre-
modern Europe and gradually became wider.
Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of actual output qi among craftsmen for two values
of knowledge k, where the dashed line corresponds to a higher state of knowledge. The
kinks in the distribution functions represent the points above which potential produc-
tivity is constrained by the average knowledge in the society. Because of the specific
shape of the exponential distribution, the share of craftsmen who are constrained by the







Figure 7: Distribution Function of Productivity at time t (solid line) and t′ > t (dashed
line)
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Given the exponential distribution for hi and (25), potential output q¯i follows a Fre´chet
distribution with shape parameter 1/k and scale parameter 1/θ.
We can now express the total supply of effective labor by craftsmen as a function of state




h−θi (k exp(−khi)) dhi =
∫ ∞
0




t−1 exp(−x)dx is the Euler gamma function. Given (26), the actual
output qi of a craftsman is:






The threshold for hi below which craftsmen are constrained by average knowledge is
given by:
hˆ = k−1Γ(1− θ)−1/θ.









Here Λ is a constant given by:
Λ = Γ(1− θ) + exp[−Γ(1− θ)−1/θ]θΓ(−θ) + Γ(1− θ, Γ(1− θ)−1/θ),
and Γ(t, s) =
∫ ∞
s x
t−1 exp(−x)dx is the incomplete gamma function. The total supply of
craftsmen’s labor L in efficiency units is then given by the expected output per craftsmen
E (qi) multiplied by the number of craftsmen N:
L = N kθ Λ.
In sum, all the results in the benchmark continue to hold with the “Leonardo” assump-
tion, up to some constant terms: Γ(1− θ) should be replaced by Λ.
In the proof of Proposition 3, the “Leonardo” assumption requires to compute ∂E (q′)/
∂k′ differently. In particular, in deriving E (q′) with respect to k′ we should be careful
in taking as given the future average society knowledge q¯′ = (k′)θΓ(1 − θ), i.e. the













hˆ′ = Γ(1− θ)−1/θ/k′.
Integrating we obtain:
E (q′) = (1− exp[Γ(1− θ)/θ]) q¯ + (k′)θ Γ(1− θ, Γ(1− θ)−1/θ)
and the derivative is
∂E (q′)
∂k′
= θΓ(1− θ, Γ(1− θ)−1/θ)(k′)θ−1 = Θ(k′)θ−1.
with Θ = θΓ(1− θ, Γ(1− θ)−1/θ). Compared to the benchmark, there is a factor Γ(1−
θ, Γ(1− θ)−1/θ) instead of a factor Γ(1− θ).
C Proof of Proposition 2
The threshold for sufficient altruism is given by
γˆ =
(δ(nF)− κnF) n¯s
(1− α)(nF)2 Γ(1− θ), with n
F = (1+ ν)
(1−α)θ
α .
We claim that the balanced growth path exists if γ > max{0, γˆ}.
Let us first compute the balanced growth path, supposing it exists. The growth rate of
knowledge in (b) comes from (13) where we have imposed m = mF = 1. Population
growth is obtained using (10). Income per capita in (c) derives from (9). Utility in (d) is
derived as follows: Income of a given craftsman is qi (1− α) YL + κaF (from (5)). Expected
income, using (6), is kθΓ(1− θ)(1− α)YL + κaF + αyF, where αyF is income from owning
land. Given the value of L from (7), this simplifies into (1− α) YN + κaF + αyF. The future
labor income of the child is (1− α)yF.
For the balanced growth path defined above to be incentive compatible, i.e. parents are
indeed willing to provide their kids with teaching, the cost of teaching should be less
than the gain in the income, as evaluated by the altruistic parents. Normalizing the labor
income of a craftsman without training to zero, this condition is:





= γ nF(1− α)yF.
Using (6) and (7), this condition determines a lower bound on the altruism factor γ:
γˆ >
(δ(nF)− κnF) n¯s
(1− α)(nF)2 Γ(1− θ).
62
D Proof of Proposition 3














Let us first compute the balanced growth path, supposing it exists. To determine the
number of apprentices per master, we use (14). Equation (15) is derived as follows. Each
apprentice learns from mC = (nC)o masters. As the draws for the initial knowledge
of masters are not independent (all these masters were educated by the same persons),
their acquired knowledge ki is the same, but they had different ideas on their own drawn
from Exp(νk−1). The acquired knowledge of the apprentices thus follows:
(ki)′ = ki + mCνk−1.
The final knowledge of the apprentices is given by
k′ = (ki)′ + νk.
Using (ki)′ = k′ − νk and (ki) = k− νk−1 in the first equation, we get
k′ − νk = k− νk−1 + mCνk−1 (27)
which leads to (15) where g = k′/k.
The average utility expression takes into account the flows between master and appren-
tices. Adults are paid as masters by aC parents the amount of δ′(aC)− κ. Their disutility
net of income from apprentices is δ(aC) − κ(aC). They also pay as parents the same
amount δ′(aC)− κ for each of their children nC to each of their master mC . The balance
is:
aC(δ′(aC)− κ)− (δ′(aC)− κ)−mCnC(δ′(aC)− κ) = −(δ(aC)− κaC).
From Equation (15) and the value of nC, the growth rate g = gC should satisfy:
g2 − (1+ ν)g + ν = νg (1−α)θoα . (28)
The left hand side is a convex function f1(g), while the right hand side is a function of g
and o, f2(g, o). Figure 8 represents these two functions for different sizes of the clan. At
the minimum possible value of g, the left hand side is smaller than the right hand side:
f1(1) = 0 < f2(1, o) = ν∀o > 0.






f2(g, ohuge)f1(g), f2(g, o)
1
ν
Figure 8: Equation (28)
• For o ≤ α
(1−α)θ , f2(g, o) is concave, crosses f1(g) once, and there exist a solution to
the equality (28).
• For α






implying that f2(g, o) is below f1(g) for large g and crosses it once. Hence there
exist a solution to the equality (28).
• If o > 2α
(1−α)θ but not “too large,” f2(g, o) cuts f1(g) twice. There are two balanced
growth paths.
• For o very large, the function f2(g, o) which is above f1(g) for g = 1, stays above it
as g increases. In that case, there is no solution to Equation (28), and no balanced
growth path. The interpretation is that the clan is so big that technological level
and population grow at an accelerating rate.
We can summarize these findings by defining o¯, such that if o ≤ o¯, a balanced growth
path exists.





∂ f1/∂g− ∂ f2/∂g .
The term ∂ f2/∂o is positive as g > 1. We conclude that increasing o increases g for
equilibria where ∂ f1/∂g > ∂ f2/∂g, that is where f2(g, o) cuts f1(g) from above as g
increases.
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Let us now consider whether such an equilibrium is incentive compatible. If o is too
low, the threat of punishment is insufficient to prevent shirking, and only the family
equilibrium exists. If o is large, parents may no longer be willing to apprentice their
children with all current adult members of the clan. In other words, the clan should be
large enough for the threat of punishment to ensure compliance, but small enough for
parents to be willing to pay the apprenticeship fee. Hence, there exists thresholds omin
and omax such that if omax > o > omin the clan equilibrium is incentive compatible.
Assuming that the punishment technology is such that one person can do only negligi-
ble harm to another, but more than one person can exert a much more damaging action,
sufficient in any case to deter shirking, we get omin = 0.38 Let us now consider omax.
The clan equilibrium is sustained if, for each child, the marginal cost paid to the master
is lower than the expected marginal benefit, as priced by the parents:









The right hand side represents the expected effect on individual productivity of meeting
an additional master. (1− α)Y′L′ is exogenous for the individual, and the altruism param-
eter γ reflects that the marginal benefit is seen from the point of view of the parent.




The term ∂k′/∂m can be directly obtained using (27) and is equal to νk−1. Finally, the













using (7). Condition (29) can now be rewritten as:


















The left hand side is increasing in o as gC > 1, gC is increasing in o, and δ(a) is convex. If
it is smaller than the right hand side for the minimum value of o (o = 0, gC = 1+ ν), i.e.














then either the right hand side becomes larger than the left hand side for some value of
o = oˆ > 0, or they never intersect, in which case oˆ is infinite. Notice that the right hand
side is decreasing in gC, and hence in o, provided that
(1− α)θ < 2α,
in which case, omax, the maximum size of the clan which is incentive compatible, is
necessarily finite.
In the analysis of the incentive compatibility, we have assumed that gC was defined, we
show above that it is not the case o > o¯. Hence, the threshold above which a balanced
growth path exists and is incentive compatible is omax = min{o¯, oˆ}.
E Proof of Lemma 1
The first-order condition for the parent’s problem can be written as:
p︸︷︷︸
marginal cost














and using k′ = k(m + ν) (from (13)) as masters are now drawn randomly, we obtain, in
equilibrium:







Using (7), this equation simplifies into





F Proof of Proposition 4
For a fixed number of masters m, the market equilibrium yields higher growth in pro-
ductivity because those masters are drawn randomly. Indeed, from the proof of Propo-
sition 3, productivity in C follows
k′ = (1+ ν)k + (m− 1)νk−1
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(1+ ν)2 + 4(m− 1)ν
2
which is always less than the growth rate with the market, m + ν, for ν > 0 and m > 1.
Moreover, the equilibrium number of masters mM is higher in the market equilibrium
compared to the clan equilibrium. Indeed, mM balances marginal cost and benefit. If the
clan equilibrium had a higher number of masters, it would not be incentive compatible
(parents would not like to pay all those masters).
Notice that, in the computation of the utility, the payments from apprentices, paM, and
for children, pnMmM, balance.
G Proof of Lemma 2




pjaj − δ(aj) + κaj
}
subject to:




























mj = γ− θm + ν m.
which can be solved for S′j:
S′j =
[
(γ− θ)m + γν






The second constraint can be rewritten as:
pj = γθ(1− α) 1m + ν
Y′
N′
(γ− θ)m + γν
(γ− θ)mj + γν
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and the equilibrium on the apprenticeship market (32) is:
aj = n S′j mj.
These constraints imply that lowering the supply of apprenticeships aj increases the








(γ− θ)m + γν
(γ− θ)mj + γν + κ
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Ω(m) can be further simplified into:
Ω(m) =
1− λ+ (λ− θ)m− (γ−θ)m
(γ−θ)m+γν
1− λ+ (λ− θ)m− λ (γ−θ)m
(γ−θ)m+γν
.




→ ∞ and Ω(m)→ 1.
H Proof of Proposition 5
Before considering the optimization problem, let us compute the effect of changing mj
on income Ij. Using Equation (7), we can compute the relative quantity of efficient labor









With this expression, and with Equation (6), which adapts to trade j as Eqj = Γ(1− θ)kθj ,
it is convenient to rewrite expected income as:












Let us now compute the effect of changing mj on individual income. Using the result in










































Marginal income is therefore equal to expected income multiplied by: θmj+ν .
To study the equilibrium, one should consider Equation (24) replacing aG, mG and yG by
their value:




Ω(gG − ν). (33)
This equation describes a relationship between gG and nG which we call the “apprentice-
ship monopolistic market,” as it is derived from the demand for apprenticeship and the
monopolistic behavior of the guild. Equation (33) can be rewritten as:
nG =
κ




If we compare this expression with the equivalent in the market equilibrium, Equation
(20), we see that the denominator is necessarily larger. Hence, for any given g, nG < nM.
It follows that gG < gM.
Notice finally that, as in the market equilibrium, the payments from apprentices, paG,
and for children, pnGmG, balance in the computation of the utility.
I Proof of Proposition 6
We can compute the gains of adopting the guild institution as:
uF→G − uF→F = γn0(yG1 − yF1) + κ(a0 − n0)− δ(a0) + δ(n0)− µ(N0),
uC→G − uC→C = γn0(yG1 − yC1) + κ(a0 − (n0)o+1)− δ(a0) + δ((n0)o+1)− µ(N0).
N makes people in the family equilibrium indifferent between adopting the guild or not,
i.e., it solves:
γn0(yG1 − yF1) + κ(a0 − n0)− δ(a0) + δ(n0)− µ(N) = 0.
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One should show that for N0 = N, people in the clan equilibrium do not want to adopt
the guild, i.e.:
γn0(yG1 − yC1) + κ(a0 − (n0)o+1)− δ(a0) + δ((n0)o+1)− µ(N) < 0.
This is true if:
γn0yC1 + (κ(n0)
o+1 − δ((n0)o+1)) > γyF1 + κn0 − δ(n0). (34)
Let us define the following function:
ψ(m) = γn0u(m) + κmn0 − δ(mn0).
u(m) is the function that relates future income to number of masters learning from, in
the context of the clan equilibrium. From (8) and (27), we get:
u(m) = Γ(1− θ)1−α ((1+ ν)k− νk−1 + mνk−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
k′
)(1−α)θ (N′)−α.
Hence, u(m) is increasing and concave in m. As a consequence, ψ(m) is also concave in
m (δ(·) is convex). To see whether it is increasing, we can compute:
ψ′(m) = γ n0(1− α)Γ(1− θ)1−αθ(k′)(1−α)θ−1νk−1 (N′)−α + κn0 − δ′(mn0)n0.
We also know from Appendix D that the clan equilibrium is sustained if the marginal
cost paid to the master is less than the expected marginal benefit, i.e. δ′((n0)o+1)− κ ≤
∂yC1/∂m0, which implies, from (31) and (8):
γθ (1− α)Γ(1− θ)1−α (k′)(1−α)θ−1νk−1 (N′)−α + κ − δ′(mn0) ≥ 0.
This individual level condition implies that, at the aggregate equilibrium, ψ′(m) > 0.
Using the mean value theorem for derivatives, we know there exists m˜ ∈ [1, mC] such
that (ψ(mC)− ψ(1))/(mC − 1) = ψ′(m˜). As ψ(·) is concave, ψ′(m˜) > ψ′(mC) > 0 which
proves ψ(mC) > ψ(1) and inequality (34) holds.
N makes people in the clan equilibrium indifferent between adopting the guild or not,
i.e. it solves
γn0(yG1 − yC1) + κ(a0 − (n0)o+1)− δ(a0) + δ((n0)o+1)− µ(N) = 0.
One should show that for N0 = N, people in the family equilibrium also want to adopt
the guild, i.e.:
γn0(yG1 − yF1) + κ(a0 − n0)− δ(a0) + δ(n0)− µ(N) > 0.
This is true as µ(N) < µ(N).
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